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INTRODUCTION
This report presents the results of a study of vari-
ables affecting aviation in the United States during
the last fifth of the twentieth century. Its purpose
is to present estimates of relevant future develop-
ments and identify their probable impact on the
aviation industry in this country. Toward this end,
a series of key trends relating to economic, social,
political, technological, ecological and environ-
mental developments have been identified and are
discussed with relation to their possible effects
on aviation. From this analysis a series of scenarios
has been developed representing an array of possi-
bilities ranging from severe economic depression
and high international tension on the one hand to
a world of detente which enjoys an unprecedented
economic growth rate and relaxation of tensions
on the other. A "surprise free"* scenario is pre-
sented which represents our best judgment to the
manner in which events wll most probably develop
and the effect on the aviation industry such
developments will likely produce.
Projections of the future environment of an organi-
zation, or group of organizations, like the aero-
nautical industry, depend upon extrapolation of
certain relatively predictable variables, such as
envelope curves for computer capacities, but also
upon extrapolation of such unstable social vari-
ables which introduces enormous uncertainties into
complex projections. Second, and frequently more
important, the environment can change because
of conscious policies, and those policies are fre-
quently unpredictable. Thus, it is impossible to
provide any degree of certainty to projections of
most variables, it is impossible to generate a precise
range of probabilities for the major alternatives,
and important variables always will depend upon
the vagaries of political decision. Nonetheless, even
among complex social processes influenced by
political decisions, there exist relatively stable
trends because of long lead times for decisions to
be implemented and because those decisions have
effects over still longer periods of time. There is a
common fallacy that quantifiable variables are
invariably easier to predict than qualitative vari-
ables, because we have seemingly sophisticated
methodologies for the projection of numerical
variables such as gross national product, popula-
tion, or computer capacity. In fact this is not so,
because qualitative variables often behave in much
more stable fashion. Culture, values, lifestyles,
national character, and other similarly difficult-
to-quantify variables frequently are much easier
to predict because of their greater stability.
For example, a scholar writing in 1830, as de
Tocqueville did, would find it much easier to pre-
dict the degree to which Americans in 1975
would emphasize democracy, achievement, egali-
tarianism, economic attainment, and the rule of
law as central values of their lives, then he would
to predict the population of the country in 1975.
Moreover, the rising sophistication of demographic
projection techniques throughout this century
has not proved very successful at enhancing the
accuracy of middle- and long-range projections.
The report is organized into three basic sections;
identification of key trends, an examination of
world futures growing from these, and the possible
impact on aviation growth of the projected
developments. In addition, detailed examinations
of factors which may have particular significance in
future developments relating to aviation are
attached at the end of this report (See Attach-
ments I, II, and III.)
* Although we always expect the future to bring surprises, the least-surprising scenario is clearly the "best
estimate" for planning purposes. See Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, The Year 2000: A framework
for Speculation (New York: Macmillan) 1967.
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SUMMARY
PURPOSE AND SCOPE:
To identify, analyze and interpret domestic and world economic, technological, political and social trends
which may affect U.S. aviation development and growth during the period 1980-2000.
METHODOLOGY:
Identification of key variables and trends and projections of possible future environments based upon
extrapolations of selected quantifiable and qualitative variables.
SOME KEY TRENDS:
• Development of some degree of weather control and/or climate modification
• Continuation of industrial development
• Expansion of international trade and travel among the countries of the Pacific Basin
• Expanding role of multinational corporations
• Short-term technological crises of various sorts
• Alleviation of food shortages through development of improved distribution systems and continuation of
the "green revolution"
• Continuation of the sunbelt shift in the U.S.—development of South and Southwest and relative decline
of parts of North and North-Central U.S.
• Continuing decline in the rate of U.S. and world population growth
• Continued growth of U.S. GNP, probably at about 3 percent annually.
• Continued availability of critical resources well into the next century—no serious shortages developing
• Development of adequate alternative energy sources by century's end
• No major wars—no major peace. Defense spending continuing at preset levels, possibly rising over time if
crises occur
BEST ESTIMATE OF WORLD FUTURE:
• Continued economic growth in West and accelerated industrialization of developing countries as multi-
national corporations grow and expand operations abroad
• Pacific Basin Growth sparked by Japan
• Decline in World Energy Prices over time as oil production in non-OPEC areas increases and use of coal
and other substitutes expands
iii
• GNP Growth in U.S. and world continues, but at slightly slower pace
• World Population Growth rate turns downward and moves toward ultimate stability, but population
growth remains as problem in the year 2000
• International Relations should stabilize as U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship normalizes
• Few Radical Political Changes outside third and fourth worlds
• Development of Megalopolises in U.S. and developed world—sunbelt shift continues
GENERAL IMPACT ON AVIATION:
• Military R&D will remain principal focus of R&D efforts.
• U.S. will continue to dominate world aviation market.
• U.S. will emphasize tactical air defense.
• Major breakthroughs possible which could drastically alter military posture; (e.g., V/STOL).
• Air Transport growth to continue at about 9% per year.
Emphasis on greater comfort, economy, efficiency, rather than speed in new transport designs.
• Civil Aviation's market should steadily expand as world economies grow.
IV
Key TRENDS
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS
Basic Values
The most stable social trends are those concerning
basic values, including fundamental views of the
goals of life, the nature of the family, and the
nature of society. Basic values do change, for
instance as a series of generations move from being
peasants to being urban workers to being middle
class businessmen to being upper middle class
professionals. But the values of classes and of
whole societies change very slowly indeed. In
recent years semi-popular literature has arisen
suggesting that the U.S. and the world are under-
going fundamental changes of values away from
middle class economic striving and toward "Con-
sciousness IN" or "quality of life" or "steady-
state" or even "hippy culture." But the funda-
mental fact is that most of the population of the
United States remains solidly committed to classi-
cal middle class economic striving as the basic way
of life. In other industrialized countries the com-
mitment to this classic style of life is even more
profound, because these other countries have not
yet attained the material levels, and the security of
prosperity, which is a prerequisite of the shift to
non-economic values. The current world recession
demonstrates vividly how profound the commit-
ment to these economic values remains, and how
threatened the industrialized world becomes when
these values are threatened. Finally, and most
important of all, the vast majority of the world's
people are just entering the initial phases of com-
mitment to bourgeois values, and as they taste the
first fruits of economic growth (riding bicycles
instead of working, then riding cars instead of
bicycles) their commitment will intensify. Thus
the most profound global trend in basic values is
movement into middle class economic striving, not
movement away from it, and the consequence will
be worldwide pressures for economic growth, for
the communications and transport systems upon
which such growth depends, and for the consumer
goods and tourism that are the fruits of such
growth.
Super-Industrial Society
The structural economic consequence of this
rising pressure of economic striving will be what we
call the super-industrial society. The phrase "super-
industrial" refers here to both the-scale and the
scope of technology. In super-industrial society the
scale of technology rises to the point where the
U.S. space program, the million ton tanker, and the
trillion dollar Japanese infrastructure development
plan become economically and technologically
feasible. Likewise, in super-industrial society the
scope of industrial society spreads from the cur-
rently industrialized countries until it covers most
or all of the world. The continued rise of the
super-industrial society carries with it rising afflu-
ence for humanity, rising ability of man to control
nature and his own destiny, and also the problems
of pollution, resource bottlenecks and scarcity, and
loss of nerve, all of which are concomitants of the
positive achievements.
The rise of the super-industrial society brings with
it a rising shift from primary extractive industries
and secondary manufacturing industries into ser-
vice industries. (See Figure 1.) The service industries
require different styles of work and stimulate
different habits of mind than the earlier forms of
human labor, and thus, they make possible certain
shifts of attitudes and values. Societies in which
services have become the employers of most of the
population have come to be labeled post-industrial
societies, and it is fair to label some of their asso-
ciated values as post-industrial values. Thus, as
societies become affluent and educated, more
and more people concern themselves with non-
economic values, emphasizing "quality of life"
rather than "standard of living."
THE U.S. WORK FORCE
60
CO
cc
LLJ
X.
CC
o
50
40
LL
O
V)
30
20
SERVICE-PRODUCING INDUSTRIES
Trade,,
Services^
Government^
Finance, insurance
and real estate,.
Transportation and
public utilities^
^\ ^ — --^~
GOODS-PRODUCING INDUSTRIES
Manufacturing Mining
Contract construction Agriculture
70 75 19801947 50 55 60 65
YEAR
SOURCE: THE U.S. ECONOMY IN 1980, BULLETIN 1673.
FIGURE 1
These latter emphases, and the rising ability of the
affluent to choose among alternative lifestyles
rather than simply grinding away at manufacturing
jobs, have given rise to the literature on the passing
of middle class economic values. But what this
literature sometimes forgets is how tiny a propor-
tion of U.S. and global population really possesses
these new values and choices. In the most affluent
lands, post-industrial society does not replace
super-industrial society and coexists with it as a
tiny, rather isolated pocket of post-economic
values. And for the vast mass of humanity, indus-
trial society and middle class values constitute an
optimistic view of the future rather than an obso-
lete civilization. The most outstanding example of
this upward thrust of much of the world into
industrial civilization is the phenomenon Hudson
Institute has labeled the rise of the Pacific Basin.
This example is discussed in detail under Interna-
tional Trade.
Technology Related Crises
Although we project long-term growth, and the
continuing emergence of the super-industrial
society, short-term setbacks may occur, or crises
of great importance may make fairly serious
alterations in the patterns and rates of growth.
More fundamentally, the rise of the super-industrial
society ensures that mistakes, as well as successes,
will be of great magnitude. Massive pollution,
nuclear accidents, culturing and release of mutated
viruses, and other disasters become possible in the
super-industrial society, as do political explosions
resulting from competition to take advantage of
the new opportunities opened up by technology—
for instance, new opportunities to exploit the
seabed. Some of the possible crises (See Table 1),
on "1985 Technological Crises," the name of
which is taken from von Neumann's famous
article predicting that 1985 would see the rise of
crises of excessively large-scale technology.*
A second kind of crisis can also have important
consequences for high-technology organizations.
This second kind of crisis occurs not in the super-
industrial states, but in the emerging industrial
states. Wherever health technology has outrun food
technology and other forms of economic develop-
ment, great masses of poor and sometimes starving
people result, and when this happens the post-
industrial world focuses its attention on the crisis
and comes to regard high technology and dis-
pensible post-industrial programs as "frivolous."
And even in the super-industrial, post-industrial
parts of the world, whenever recession or crime or
power shortages or some other social phenomenon
threatens basic middle class comforts, attention
focuses on the immediate crisis; post-industrial
esthetics and super-industrial triumphs become
expendable.
Desire for Land
Only slightly less predictable than the overall,
worldwide pressure for continued frowth, and at
least as predictable as the continuation of such
trends as Pacific Basin takeoff, are certain basic
demographic patterns. In the U.S., suburbanization
is such a pattern. Suburbanization derives from a
"These issues as well as those related to changing values are explored by A. J. Wiener in "Faust's Progress
Report: Technology, Changing Values, and the Reactions Against Rationality," a draft report to the
National Endowment for the Humanities.
1985 TECHNOLOGICAL CRISES
BY 1985 THE FOLLOWING AREAS ARE LIKELY TO
GIVE RISE TO SPECIAL TECHNOLOGICAL DANGER:
1. Intrinsically dangerous technology
2. Gradual worldwide and/or national contamination
or degradation of the environment
3. Spectacular and/or multinational contamination or
degradation of the environment
4. Dangerous internal political issues
5. Upsetting international consequences
6. Dangerous personal choices
7. Bizarre issues
1. Intrinsically Dangerous Technology
A. Modern means of mass destruction
B. Nuclear reactors—fission or fusion
C. Nuclear explosives, high-speed gas centrifuges, etc.
D. Research missiles, satellite launchers, commercial
aircraft, etc.
E. Biological and chemical "progress"
F. Molecular biology and genetics
G. "Mind control"
H. New techniques for insurgency, criminality, terror
or ordinary violence
I. New techniques for counterinsurgency or imposi-
tion of order
J. New serendipities and synergisms
2. Gradual Worldwide and/or National Contamina-
tion or Degradation of the Environment
A. Radioactive debris from various peaceful nuclear
issues
B. Possible greenhouse or other effects from increased
CC>2 in the atmosphere, or new ice age because of
dust in stratosphere, etc.
C. Other special dangerous wastes-methyl, mercury,
DDT, etc.
D. Waste heat
E. Other less dangerous but environment degrading
wastes such as debris and garbage
F. Noise, ugliness and other annoying byproducts of
many modern activities
G. Excessive urbanization
H. Excessive overcrowding
I. Excessive tourism
J. Insecticides, fertilizers, growth "chemicals," food
additives, plastic containers, etc.
3. Spectacular and/or Multinational Contamina-
tion or Degradation of the Environment
A. Nuclear war
B. Nuclear testing
C. Bacteriological and chemical war or accident
D. Artificial moons
E. Projects West Ford, Storm Fury, etc.
F. Supersonic transportation (shock waves)
G. Weather control
H. Big "geomorphological" projects
I. Million-ton tankers (Torre Canyon was only 111,825
tons) and million-pound planes
J. Other enterprise or mechanism of "excessive" size
A.
B.
C.
D.
H.
I.
J.
A.
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C.
D.
E.
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G.
H.
I.
J.
A.
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F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
A.
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C.
D.
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4. Dangerous Internal Political Issues
Computerized records
Other computerized surveillance
Other advanced techniques for surveillance
Excessively degradable (or unreliably reassuring)
centralized capabilities
Improved knowledge of, and techniques for, agit-
prop and other means of creating disturbances
Improved knowledge of, and techniques for, pre-
venting disturbances
Complex or critical governmental issues leading to
either "technocracy" or "Caesarism"
Nuclear weapons affecting internal politics
Excessively illusioned attitudes
Other dangerous attitudes
5. Upsetting International Consequences
Both new and "traditional" demonstration effects
Technological obsolescence of "unskilled" labor
New synthetics, (e.g., coffee, oil etc.)
Forced modernization
Growing guilt feelings by many in wealthy nations—
particularly among the alienated or young
Inexpensive and widely available "realistic" com-
munications and physical travel
Accelerated "brain drains"
Cheap (synthetic?) food
Cheap education
Control and exploitation of the oceans, space,moon
6. Dangerous Personal Choices
Sex determination
Other genetic engineering
Psychedelic and mood-affecting drugs
Electronic stimulation of pleasure centers
Other method of sensual satisfaction
Excessive permissiveness and indulgence
Dropping out and other alienation
Excessive narcissim or other self-regard
Super-cosmetology
Lengthy hibernation
7. Bizarre Issues
Generational changes, (e.g., extended longevity)
Mechanically dependent humans, (e.g., pacemakers)
Life and death for an individual, (e.g., artificial
kidneys, etc.)
New forms of humanity, (e.g., "live" computer)
"Forcible" birth control for "impossible" groups
Other external controls or influence on what
should be a personal or even institutionally private
choice
Life and death or other control of "outlaw" soci-
eties which have not yet committed any traditional
crime
Even the continuation of the nation-state system
Controlling and limiting change and innovation
Radical ecological changes on a planetary scale
Interplanetary contamination
TABLE I
deeply ingrained American desire for living space-
as shown (See Tables II and III.) Although some-
times characterized by those who dislike it as a
relatively ephemeral phenomenon of "flight from
the cities" or as a consequence of certain post-
World War II government policies, suburbaniza-
tion will lead to the formation of vast megalo-
polies, such as those Kahn and Wiener called in
The Year 2000 (op.cit) "San-San" and "Boswash."
Continuing suburbanization is facilitated by vari-
ous economic and technological trends, including
improved communications, the rise of a service
economy, and the vitality of electronics and other
industries which do not require large factories,
because these trends facilitate the movement of
work to the suburbs and to quasi-rural areas.
THE DESIRE FOR LAND
PREFER
CITY
SUBURB
SMALLTOWN
FARM
YEAR
1960
22%
28
31
18
1966
18%
26
31
24
1971
17%
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25
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13%
31
32
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SOURCE: GALLUP POLLS
THE DESIRE FOR LAND
LARGE CITY OR
SUBURB
MEDIUM SIZED CITY
OR SUBURB
SMALLTOWN OR
CITY
OPEN COUNTRY
LIVE NOW
27%
28
33
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30
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100%
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NATIONAL
RACE
WHITE
NON-WHITE
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COLLEGE
HIGH SCHOOL
GRADE SCHOOL
OCCUPATION
PROF. & BUS.
WHITE COLLAR
FARMERS
MANUAL
AGE
18-20
21-29
30-49
50 & OVER
RELIGION
PROTESTANT
CATHOLIC
OTHER
POLITICS '
REPUBLICAN
DEMOCRAT
INDEPENDENT
REGION
EAST
MIDWEST
SOUTH
WEST
INCOME
$1 5,000 & OVER
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$ 5,000-$ 6,999
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1, 000,000 & OVER
500,000-999,999
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TABLE II TABLE III
Rural Migration—Re-Urbanization
This trend of work moving out of the central cities
to where people live should continue and accele-
rate. As a result the populations of the centers of
the biggest cities are not likely to rise. Because
commuting has become so time-consuming, satel-
lite cities like White Plains, Framingham and
San Jose will develop and prosper. For the same
reason, many of those who continue to work in
the central cities will intensely desire to live closer
to their work, and as a result a vast rebuilding of
the residential areas of the central cities will soon
begin to progress rapidly. This phenomenon of
white, upper middle class influx into, and rebuild-
ing of, formerly black, lower class areas has already
begun to occur in many of the largest cities, for
instance in the Capitol area of Washington, D.C.
The formation of new ghetto areas should be
greatly reduced, because the plight of present inner
cities was the consequence of a vast migration that
is now topping out—namely, the migration of poor,
black, uneducated Southerners from the low-
welfare, poor-wage states of the South to the
comparatively high-welfare, high-wage cities of the
North and the coasts. Likewise, white migration
from the rural South to the North has ended, and
black migration from the inner cities of the North
to northern suburbs is beginning and should accele-
rate rapidly whenever the national economy is
prospering.
Effect of Climate on Demography
The old movement of the poor from the South to
the North is increasingly being replaced by a new
movement of the rich from the North to the South,
a movement we call "The Sunbelt Shift." (See
Table IV.) The reasons for this movement include
rising cultural emphasis on recreation and informal
leisure, increasing numbers of older people (who
find the South more healthful), and basic economic
considerations having to do with shift from the
19th century industrial base centered on North-
eastern coal, steel, and shipping, to employment
increasingly dominated by services and by light,
high-technology manufacturing with low trans-
portation costs.
In addition to the personal and social benefits of
good climate, there are considerable economic
benefits which are very important. Construction
can be undertaken year-round and building stand-
ards need not be as severe. Heating costs are lower,
but are cancelled out by the costs of air-condition-
ing. In many small ways the costs are lower. People
can wear fewer and cheaper clothes; medical bills
are lower; there are no snow clearance costs; cars
last longer. Warm areas are better places to be
poor—a substandard dwelling is less intolerable
when the temperature stays high. We believe that
the benefits of living in warmer climates will
encourage a southerly migration for the remainder
of this century. At some time, probably not in the
next decade, white southbound migrants will be
followed by the more prosperous non-whites.
Climate is much more important than it was in the
past because people are relatively more important
to our developing service economy than are raw
materials. The jobs go where people want to be,
rather than vice versa. Road and air transport
permit much more flexibility in location than sea
and rail did. Other technological changes permit-
ting movement toward leisure areas involve com-
munications, medical services and recreational
vehicles. Moreover, new resort areas have been
given widespread publicity.
Most of the rural areas and small towns of America
are in decline, but there are many interesting
exceptions which may herald a strong trend in the
future. Certain areas which ought to be declining
area indeed prospering because they support great
leisure activities. The best example is the hilly areas
of New England, which have been undergoing out-
ward migration for well over a century, yet in
recent years have seen a reversal as farmers have
been replaced by increasing numbers of skiers. The
same is true of the ex-mining communities of
Colorado and California. The former fishing and
whaling communities on Cape Cod have converted
long ago to leisure use. Flourishing beach areas
throughout the country are other examples, as are
the rapid development of Florida and many desert
areas of the Southwest. (See Table V.)
In addition, communities devoted to certain recrea-
tional facilities may spring up within urban areas.
We are already noticing small boating communities
around marinas. In the Midwest there is a strong
tradition of "a cabin in the woods" for hunting,
fishing, and getting away from it all.
THE SUN BELT SHIFT
Urbanized Areas over 1/2
Million Population
• RAPID GROWTH (OVER 100%)
Phoenix
Miami
Sacramento
St. Petersburg
San Diego
Houston
Dallas
Atlanta
Los Angeles
Jacksonville
Norfolk
Denver
Oklahoma City
a MODERATE GROWTH (50-100%)
Seattle
Hartford
Dayton
Washington, D.C.
San Francisco
Columbus
Twin Cities
Memphis
Indianapolis
Portland, Ore.
San Antonio
Kansas City
Cleveland
Louisville
Milwaukee
• SLOW GROWTH (UNDER 50%)
Akron
Rochester
New Orleans
Chicago
Detroit
Springfield, Mass.
Philadelphia
Cincinnati
Baltimore
New York
St. Louis
Providence
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Pittsburgh
POPULATION
GROWTH
1950-70
300%
250
200
195
177
137
136
132
123
118
116
110
110
99%
97
97
93
83
80
73
64
63
61
61
58
55
55
51
48%
47
46
44
44
44
38
37
36
34
34
33
26
25
21
20
AVERAGE
JANUARY
TEMPERATURE
(DEGREES, °F)
50
67
45
55
56
54
46
45
54
56
41
28
37
38
26
32
37
51
30
12
42
29
38
50
32
28
35
21
29
25
55
26
27
24
32
34
35
32
32
29
44
30
25 .
29
TABLE IV
U.S. REGIONAL POPULATION CHANGE
YEAR
1950
(MILLIONS)
1970
(MILLIONS)
% CHANGE
1960 - 70
NET
MIGRATION
1960-70
, WHITE BLACK
REGION
NORTHEAST
MIDWEST
SOUTH
WEST
NATION
39
44
47
20
151
49
57
63
39
205
10
10
14
24
13
-1
-3
4
9
20
11
-12
28
LARGE STATES
CALIFORNIA
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
TEXAS
ILLINOIS
OHIO
MICHIGAN
NEW JERSEY
FLORIDA
MASSACHUSETTS
11
15
10
8
9
8
6
5
3
5
20
18
12
11
11
11
9
7
7
6
27
9
20
17
10
10
13
18
37
10
11
-4
-4
1
-2
-2
_2
6
33
1
31
28
3
12
6
17
23
-4
30
OTHER RAPID GROWING STATES
% CHANGE
1960-70
SLOW GROWING STATES
% CHANGE
1960-70
NEVADA
ARIZONA
ALASKA
COLORADO
MARYLAND
DELAWARE
HAWAII
VERMONT
71
36
33
26
26
23
22
22
W. VIRGINIA
N. DAKOTA
S. DAKOTA
IDAHO
MISSOURI
IOWA
MISSISSIPPI
KANSAS
-6
-2
-2
1
2
2
2
3
TABLE V
Generally, this is a favorable development; these
leisure opportunities provide numerous service jobs
for the local indigenous population. The old
inhabitants live off the new settlers. Note also the
long history of summer resort areas within range of
metropolitan areas gradually being transferred
from seasonal to permanent occupancy. As the
cities spread out, we may expect this process to
continue. In our "surprise-free"projection, these
trends continue:
1. The sun belt shift—a continuing growth of
most of the warmer areas of the U.S.
2. Further growth of other quaternary* areas-
desirable places because of their natural
environment (e.g., the ski-belt areas such as
the Colorado Rockies, the California Sierras
and Vermont; in general, the beach and lake
areas), or because of their cultural environ-
ment (e.g;, San Francisco and posh areas of
Manhattan).
3. Growth of the Southern Piedmont—from the
Shenandoah Valley through the Carolina
"ring city" and Atlanta to Nashville. The
area has an excellent climate, relatively good
race relations, increasingly better education,
a fine labor force, and a favorable attitude
toward business.
4. The development of Northern Florida—as
Southern Florida is filling up.
5. Development of the Pacific slope, which has
good weather, beaches and outdoor recrea-
tion.
6. The growth of Eastern Arizona and Western
New Mexico, spilling over from Southern
California and Western Arizona.
7. The development of the Boston-to-Washington
Piedmont fringe—from Maine down through
West Virginia—involving very low density
summer and ski homes, and more long-
distance commuting to major centers.
8. The growth of state capitals: big employment
centers as state governments enlarge their
functions.
9. Development of the Gulf Coast-through the
dynamic economic expansion of coastal Texas
(especially Houston), and Louisana. Cheap air
conditioning makes the area more pleasant;
beaches and waterways make it desirable.
By comparison, we list below areas that are most
likely to be declining or stagnant.
10. Old ports: traditional shipbuilding and ship-
ping are on the way out. Only a few large
deep-water ports will maintain their current
importance.
11. Old coal-and-iron areas (e.g., West Virginia,
Pittsburgh, Duluth). Even a major revival of
coal mining will be very capital-intensive and
will require much less labor. The peak of out-
migration, though, is probably past, and the
old crisis may revive investment in some old
coal fields, as well as open many new ones.
12. The Great Plains—modern farming requires
fewer farmers per year. Most of those em-
ployed in "agriculture" will work in factories
making machinery and fertilizer.
13. The black belt of the South-the penetration
of modern mechanized farming into the rural
South will displace traditional labor. But
white out-migration has already ended and
the rush of black out-migration is also prob-
ably over.
Table VI summarizes our projections for regions
and a few key rapidly growing states.
Thus, the demographic prospects for the United
States over the next quarter century are for greater
spread, lower population densities, decentralized
industries, satellite cities, rebuilt inner cities, an
end to the vast migration of the poor from the
rural South to the urban North, and—as we have
emphasized elsewhere—accelerated migration of
* Quaternary means services to services and to other post-tertiary economic activities.
the relatively affluent from the cold North to the
warmer southern states. These projections are
somewhat sensitive to energy prices, since the
decentralized demographic pattern depends upon
cheap transportation, but as we shall argue below
long-term energy prices are likely to fall as low as
pre-OPEC cartel prices.
REGIONAL POPULATIONS
(MILLIONS)
REGION
NEW ENGLAND
MIDDLE ATLANTIC
(NY-VA.)
FLORIDA
REST OF SOUTH
MIDWEST
(OHIO-MINN.)
PLAINS
TEXAS
SOUTHWEST
(N.M.-NEV.)
COLORADO
REST OF MOUNTAINS
(IDA-UTAH)
PACIFIC NORTHWEST
CALIFORNIA
HAWAII & ALASKA
TOTAL U.S.
YEAR
1975
12.5
49.0
7.5
33.4
53.9
7.6
12.0
3.6
2.4
2.9
5.9
22.1
1.1
213.9
1980
13.2
51.0
8.3
34.5
56.0
7.8
12.8
3.9
2.6
3.0
6.4
24.2
1.2
224.9
1985
13.9
53.9
8.9
35.6
59.6
8.1
13.6
4.2
2.8
3.2
6.8
26.4
1.3
238.3
TABLE VI
World Populations Trends
Another trend that tends to be relatively predict-
able, although far less than the above, is world
(or major country) population. It is worth noting
that past predictions of future American popula-
tion growth have generally turned out very poorly.
However, demographic knowledge is improving.
Certain of the discontinuities, such as the so-called
demographic transition, which were poorly under-
stood in the past are now better understood. On a
global basis trends are much more stable than they
are in any single country.
Within the population of a single country there is
a fundamental division in predictability of certain
parts of the population. Those who will be over
twenty-five in the year 2000 one can predict fairly
assuredly because they have already been born, and
age-specific death rates may not vary much. On the
other hand, those who have not been born (i.e.,
those who will be under twenty-five in the year
2000) are much more subject to depisions whether
or not to have children, which in turn are heavily
influenced by expectations, food shortages, and
economic growth trends of various kinds.
In any case, we believe that the world is now going
through an inflection point. The growth rate of
world population seems to be as high as it ever has
been and as high as it ever will be. There should be
a relatively stable trend toward decreasing rates of
population growth in the future. This projection
results from two phenomena. The first is the so-
called demographic transition: when countries
become relatively more affluent, welfare systems
and other social mechanisms tend to replace the
traditional functions performed by children, such
as support in old age, support in times of sickness,
and so forth. At the same time, education of
children becomes necessary and expensive and thus
becomes a deterrent to having too many children.
Thus there is a tendency for relatively affluent
populations to decrease their rates of population
growth. An opposite trend which has the same
influence over population growth rates is the
occurrence of food shortages and starvation in
those countries which have greatly overpopulated
themselves, particularly the Indian subcontinent
of Asia and parts of Africa. In these countries
survival has become so difficult, especially for very
young children, that because of malnutrition,
disease tends to increase the death rate to the
point where net population growth rates are much
lower than they might otherwise be. Thus, we pro-
ject a world population continuing to rise but with
a rate of growth decreasing continuously over a
very long period of time.
As shown in Table VII on "Declining Birth Expec-
tations," the expectations of fertile U.S. women
regarding the number of children they will bear
have been steadily dropping toward the rate where
population growth will cease. When 1974 data are
available we expect them to show a drop below
the zero population growth level. But this drop
does not of course mean immediate cessation of
population growth; the large bulges in the age
distribution of Americans depicted in Figure 2 on
"Distribution of the Total Population," must
first work themselves up through the child-bearing
age brackets, resulting in larger numbers, through
smaller rates of birth. We expect low birth rates
to cont inue because of the changing role of
women—with less emphasis on children and more
emphasis on the opportunity for work. Moreover,
in the short run economic troubles should cause a
further dip in the birth rate.
DECLINING BIRTH EXPECTATIONS
YEAR
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
"ZPG" LEVEL
CHILDREN EXPECTED
BY WOMEN
AGED
18-24
3.1
3.1
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.1
BY WOMEN
AGED
25-29
3.4
3.4
2.8
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.1
Age Cohorts
An equally important phenomenon tied to age
cohorts is the style of the executives running the
country's major organizations. Top executives
tend to be picked from the age cohort that is in its
mid-fifties, and middle range executives tend to be
in their mid-thirties. Since executives, like other
people, tend to carry throughout their life the
expectations and perspectives formed in their
adolescent and college years, we can identify the
cultural styles of future executives to some extent
by looking at the key experiences which occurred
in their late adolescent years. Table IX, "Changing
Executive Generations," illustrates this pheno-
menon.
AGE COHORTS
BORN IN:
BEFORE 1900
1900-1910
1910-1920
1920-1930
1930-1940
1940-1950
1950-1960
1960-1970
1970-1980
1980-1990
AGE IN:
1965
65+
55-65
45-55
35-45
25-35
15-25
5-15
0- 5
—
—
1975
75+
65+
55-65
45-55
35-45
25-35
15-25
5-15
0- 5
—
1985
85+
75+
65+
55-65
45-55
35-45
25-35
15-25
5-15
0- 5
1995
95+
85+
75+
65+
55-65
45-55
35-45
25-35
15-25
5-15
SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU P-60#254
TABLE VII TABLE VIM
As the population "bulge" does work itself up into
the older age brackets, distinct changes in the
cultural style of the population will occur. Not
surprisingly, when the bulge representing the post-
World War II "baby boom" was in its teens, the
whole American culture reflected an emphasis on
youth and the teen-age years. As this generation
has grown older (SeeTable VIII), articles in popular
magazines, advertisements on television, and
important economic markets have shifted to
reflect, first, the style and problems of people in
their twenties and now, increasingly, the tastes and
concerns of people in their early thirties. This
bulge in the population distribution thus deter-
mines the style of mass culture.
Localism
An important consequence of rising population,
spreading population, environmental concern, ris-
ing political organization, and many other currently
important trends, is the accelerating influence of
what we label "localism." Localism is a defense of
narrow local interests at the expense of the broader
needs of the community. Almost everyone gains
by having highways, moderate income housing,
factories, airports, and power plants somewhere in
their region. Almost everyone loses by having these
same kinds of infrastructure located in their neigh-
borhood. Until the last decade this conflict has not
been severe. The needed, regional facilities have
10
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CHANGING EXECUTIVE GENERATIONS
THE "55 YEAR OLD" EXECUTIVE IN:
BORN
CHILDHOOD
YOUTH
EARLY CORPORATE
MILIEU
RETIRES
1965
CIRCA 1910
WWI
PROSPEROUS 20s
DEPRESSION
CIRCA 1975
1975
CIRCA 1920
PROSPEROUS 20s
DEPRESSION
POST WAR BOOM
CIRCA 1985
1985
CIRCA 1930
DEPRESSION
WWII
"ORGANIZATION MAN"
CIRCA 1995
THE "35 YEAR OLD" EXECUTIVE IN:
BORN
CHILDHOOD
YOUTH
EARLY CORPORATE
MILIEU
RETIRES
1965
CIRCA 1930
DEPRESSION
WWII & COLD WAR
"ORGANIZATION MAN"
CIRCA 1995
1975
CIRCA 1940
WAR
"SILENT GENERATION"
TURBULENT 60s
CIRCA 2000
1985
CIRCA 1950
PROSPERITY
CAMPUS UNREST
?
CIRCA 2105
TABLE IX
almost always found a place. But recently a series
of events and trends have greatly strengthened the
hand of local obstructionists:
1. Disillusionment with progress. "You can't
fight progress" is not longer an unanswerable
argument.
2. Environmentalism. Everything pollutes some
way.
3. Anti-auto, anti-noise agitation.
4. Community control. This concept did little
for the poor, but middle-class communities can
use it with a vengeance.
5. Widespread disillusionment with institutions.
6. Flaccid and sometimes stupid leadership. You
can beat city hall.
7. Discretionary behavior. You can fight city hall
and get away with it.
Thus it becomes more difficult to install and
expand the infrastructure needed for economic
development. The problem may be compounded
by tax equilization, revenue sharing, and other
legislative or judicial acts which decouple local
revenues from local economic activity, thus reduc-
ing the incentives for local development.
ECONOMIC TRENDS
GNP Projections
Another variable which is relatively predictable
over long periods of time is gross national product.
Gross national product, however, is much more
sensitive to phenomena such as national power and
availability of inexpensive energy, which are rela-
12
lively hard to predict, than are the variables we
have discussed earlier. The projection of GNP is
best done not by simple extrapolation but by look-
ing at likely population growth, labor force parti-
cipation rates, and rates of productivity increase,
and multiplying these together to obtain projected
GNP. Gross national product growth is, of course,
subject to business cycle fluctuations but is much
more stable over the long-term than these flucu-
ations would suggest. The rate of growth of GNP
tends to become institutionalized by the social
structure. Britain, for instance, because of funda-
mental characteristics of its society such as antag-
onism between businessmen and laboring groups,
has tended to grow fairly stably at 2% per
year for at least two centuries. However it is worth
noting that, particularly in modernizing countries,
dramatic changes can sometimes occur in national
growth rates. For instance South Korea, after a
period of chas which slowed growth, became in
the late 1960s and early 1970s the fastest growing
economy in the world. Thus, relative care must be
taken in projecting the economies of countries
which are going through massive socio-political
changes in short periods of time.
It is obviously more difficult to project reliable
GNP per capita than it is to project either popula-
tion or GNP because the uncertainties in the esti-
mates of GNP and of population tend to rein-
force one another. Again, obviously, adding more
inter-acting variables makes the scenario more
realistic and useful but at the same time more
complex and uncertain.
On the following page, we have projected three
alternative growth rates for the United States,
(Table X), 2% GNP growth per year, 3% growth
and 4% growth. Over a long period of history U.S.
growth rates have fluctuated around 3% in real
terms, and despite some decrease in work-oriented
values, despite energy shortages, and, in the op-
posite direction, despite the institutionalization of
better mechanisms for absorption of technological
changes, there is reason to believe that over a long
period of time these growth rates should remain
approximately what they have been in the past.
At least, this is the least bad of all alternative
assumptions for long-range planning purposes.
We have also provided estimates of disposable
income over this 1980-2000 period of time. We
believe that if gross national product grows at
a relatively slow rate, for instance at 2%, then
increasing demands will be put on government
for welfare and other measures, and the federal
budget will grow at relatively high rates.
Inflation
The difficulty of making long-term forecasts in a
rapidly changing environment has increased
recently. During the 1960s, rising awareness of the
need to protect the natural environment led to
private and public decisions which threw monkey-
wrenches into many long-term projections. The
1974-75 inflationary recession has made economic
forecasting doubly dismal: now econometric
modelers must attempt to forecast economic vari-
ables in a period of extreme uncertainty and
anamolous expectations.
Until the late 1960s, post-war American economic
history consisted of reasonably stable growth,
relatively full employment, and slowly creeping
price inflation; macroeconomic policy, both fiscal
and monetary, had successfully moderated the
business cycle to insure against repetition of the
1930s. Until Great Society programs and the
Vietnam war accelerated price and wage inflation,
the thought of price-wage controls in peacetime
was inconceivable. By 1969, however, the annual
rate of inf lat ion passed 5% and monetary
restraint was applied to bring inflation back down
to previous levels. While unemployment increased
to over 6% in early 1971, inflation did not
subside; in August 1971, President Nixon
announce his "New Economic Policy", which
included price-wage controls (See Figure 3, "U.S.
Inflation and Unemployment, 1963-1974").
In January 1973, Phase III of the price-wage con-
trols was implemented, permitting food and
commodity prices to explode. With the quad-
rupling of oil prices in late 1973, the stage was
set for evolution of the American economy to its
present worsening situation of high inflation, high
and rising unemployment, and sharply dropping
GNP. Several alternative scenarios suggest the
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ECONOMIC CONTEXTS 1975-20001
(All estimates are in constant 1973 dollars)
U.S. GNP3
U.S.
DISPOSABLE
INCOME
U.S.2
BUDGET
I.
I I .
I I I .
I.
II.
I I I .
I.
II.
I I I .
1975
1225
1260
1299
845
870
895
305
315
325
1980
1350
1460
1580
930
1010
1120
370
365
355
1985
1490
1700
1920
1030
1170
1390
410
420
430
1990
1650
1950
2350
1150
1350
1775
450
500
525
2000
2000
2650
3450
1375
1825
2900
550
650
800
Case I. assumes GNP average growth of 2 percent/year
Case II. assumes GNP average growth of 3 percent/year
Case III. assumes GNP average growth of 4 percent/year
2Case I. assumes Budget = 27.5 percent GNP
Case II. assumes Budget = 25 percent GNP
Case III. assumed Budget = 22.5 percent GNP
(in 1975 all are taken as 25 percent of GNP)
Disposable income is assumed to remainat 69% of GNP.There are, of course, complex transfer payments between federal, state,
and local governments (e.g. revenue-sharing) and from the federal budget to personal disposable personal income (e.g. social
security). These can be expected to increase, and the total will increasingly be greater than GNP.
TABLE X
possibilities open to the American economy during
the next few years (See Figure 4, "A Relationary
Scenario"). Judicious macroeconomic policy might
accomplish a soft landing after inflation decreases
and unemployment drops slowly, following the
onset of recovery, projected by the Ford Adminis-
tration. On the other hand, recovery might be too
sharp, leading to an investment boom which
reflates both GNP and prices too quickly, at which
point inflationary expectations and corporate
illiquidity might combine to force output sharply
down. Finally, recovery might not quite set in at
all, leading to persistent high unemployment and
probably price deflation (a mini-depression).
Figure 5 illustrates the two scenarios in terms of
macroeconomic parameters.
Obviously, the American economy has entered a
new period in which the primacy of economic
anomolies has rendered conventional econometric
models less than meaningful for the purpose of
forecasting. The hazards of making business-as-
usual long-term forecasts based on traditional
economic (and other) trends need not be
elaborated, since they ought to be clear at this
point in time. Future behavior of the economy
will depend on private spending, saving and invest-
ment decisions, as well as on public fiscal and
monetary policies. Due to the current high level
of confusion in energy and economic affairs, it is
probably safe to assume that there is no single set
of policies which is both optimal and politically
practical. The next few years will see much experi-
mentation as economic and energy policymakers
attempt to sort out the complex new interactions
and to formulate policies and programs that mini-
mize collateral damage in other areas.
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U.S. INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 1963-1974
AND AN OFFICIAL OMB FORECAST, 1975-1980
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WORST PLAUSIBLE CASE" FOR CORPORATE PLANNING:
THE REFLATION CYCLE SCENARIO
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NOTE: Political responses to point of greatest pain (unemployment (E) inflation (N)) creates monetary and fiscal policies that work, but
only after time lag. During the lag, pain intensifies, and attempts to correct are re-doubled. System is impatient, lacks foresight, ultimately
over-corrects, and "hunts." System is impatient, lacks foresight, ultimately over-corrects, and "hunts."
RESULT: turbulence, long-term varying but high inflation (long-term shift towards NNE)), periodic liquidity (NE) and employment crises (E),
reductions in unemployment and recovery (SW movement) followed by reflation and boom (NW movement) followed by restrictive policies
and liquidity problems, producing clockwise turn to NE and finally E and SE as in winter 1974-5. Cycle may be repeated or may lead to
depression. Average real GNP growth low until recovery to "acceptable" rates of unemployment and inflation, as in the 1955-68 period.
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TEMPORAL EVOLUTION OF PRIMARY MACROECONOMIC PARAMETERS
IN THE TWO SCENARIOS
10 r
', CHANGE IN
REAL GNP
% UNEMPLOYMENT
OR INFLATION
GNP
\ Reflationary GNP
\ -CPI
Unemployment
Reflationary
Unemployment
Reflationary CPI
1980
NOTE: The solid lines show OMB projections (1975-80) and the dotted lines shown the reflationary scenario. Precise timing and rates of
change could vary considerably, of course. Rise in the rate of change of real output is generally preceded or accompanied by a drop in the
rate of change of prices. The lagged change in the unemployment rate in any year is approximately given by one-third of the difference bet-
ween the rate of change of real GNP and 4 percent (the productivity trend), according to Arthur Okun's well-known rule of thumb.
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Pacific Basin
One of the largest-scale long-term phenomena that
Hudson Institute has identified has been the
acceleration of economic growth in the Pacific
Basin. Because of the influence of rapid Japanese
growth, rising availability of capital in the region
(from both American and Japanese sources)
improved transportation, and the peculiarly adapt-
able traits of Chinese culture for industrial develop-
ment, the Pacific Basin region has begun to grow
very rapidly and is likely to continue to grow very
rapidly in the future. This means that commercial
17
transport needs will rise dramatically in the next
generation. It also means that tourism is likely to
experience an extraordinary development. We have
already seen the initial phases of this dramatic
increase in commerce and tourism. It is possible
that straightforward projection of these increases
would greatly underestimate the eventual strength
of the trend. We include a chart showing one
scenario for Japanese tourism which could apply
to Korea, but possible and even more likely to
Taiwan. As can be seen, the effects of vast numbers
of Japanese tourism would have a remarkable in-
fluence over Korean and Taiwanese development,
and over the development of transportation net-
works in North East Asia. (Cf. Figures 6 and 7
which show several examples of the rapid growth
of tourism.) Detailed economic projections for the
Pacific Basin and selected other regions are shown
in Appendix III of this report. The Pacific Basin
phenonmenon could be discontinued by prolonged,
severe depression, by major war, or by a major
confrontation between Japan and Southeast Asia
(e.g., over use of the Malacca Straits), but should
continue otherwise.
Multinational Corporations
Great multinational corporations, which originated
in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe,
will likely continue to expand their role as the
leading edge of technological progress; the major
determinants of the structures of national econo-
mies and the world economy; and the principal
instruments of economic development in the non-
communist world. The multinationals possess
extraordinary comparative advantages in raising
and investing capital; in creating and managing
organizations; in obtaining information and using
it for corporate planning purposes; and in innovat-
ing and transferring technology. They have superior
facilities for distributing, maintaining, marketing,
and financing their products. They furnish local
elites with extraordinary career opportunities and
therefore attract the finest talent available in much
of the world. They have created successful and
sophisticated systems for educating and upgrading
blue-collar, white-collar, and management talent.
Increasingly they provide governments with major
inputs of savings and taxes.
The rise of the multinational corporations is
favored by continued world peace, by political
stability in most countries, and by a prosperous
world economy. They obtain advantages from
those new technologies which require large
amounts of capital and advanced technological
skills, and from those which provide great econo-
mies of scale. They are favored by relative decreases
in transportation and communication costs and by
dispersion of resources and markets throughout the
world. They are also favored by increasing stand-
ardization of markets for many kinds of products
throughout the world, as well as—somewhat
paradoxically—by their exceptional ability to adapt
to changes in those markets. Hitherto, the multi-
nationals have benefited from the lack of pervasive
or effective interference from political authorities,
but one of the great imponderables for their future
is the extent to which political authorities will act
to limit the growth and capacities of the multi-
nationals. The home countries of the multina-
tionals, principally the U.S., Japan, and Western
Europe, have increasingly become sensitive to the
alleged avoidance of taxes and export of jobs to
other countries. The host countries in both the
developed and developing world have become
sensitive to what some perceive as the exploita-
tion and dependence that result from the activi-
ties of multinational corporations whose gross
sales are frequently larger than the gross national
products of the host countries.* The degree to
which these political sensitivities will inhibit the
growth of the multinationals is difficult to project,
but even if the effect is fairly strong the multi-
nationals are likely to continue growing at a
relatively rapid rate.
*Such statistics, which show General Motors as "larger" than Switzerland, have often been invoked to
suggest that G.M. is somehow more powerful than Switzerland. This is obvious political nonsense, at least
within the territory over which the Swiss government exercises sovereignty and the unchallengable power
to exclude, regulate, tax, or even expropriate G.M. Moreover, the relevant economic comparison to GNP
is not gross sales, but value added, which requires subtracting the company's purchases ("imports") from
sales.
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CURVE A
YEAR
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
90
SCENARIO 1
SPENDING
PER CAPITA
S300
350
400
450
500
500
500
500
INCOME
(MILLIONS $)
225
525
1,200
2,250
4,000
6,000
7,500
10,000
SCENARIO 2
SPENDING
PER CAPITA
$400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
INCOME
(MILLIONS $)
300
675
1,500
2,750
4,800
7,800
10,500
15,000
CURVES
I I I I I I
YEAR
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
90
SCENARIO 1
SPENDING
PER CAPITA
$300
350
400
450
500
500
500
500
INCOME
(MILLIONS $)
225
420
800
1,350
2,250
3,000
3,750
5,000
SCENARIO 4
SPENDING
PER CAPITA
S400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
INCOME
(MILLIONS $)
300
540
1,000
1,650
2,700
3,900
5,250
7,500
1974 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 1990
YEAR
ENTRIES
YEAR
1969
1970
1971
1972
KIMPO
AIRPORT
SEOUL
102,419
132,135
165,736
266,120
PUSAN
AIRPORT
14,868
24,198
43,955
61,329
SEAPORT
8,819
14,225
18,129
29,815
CHEJU
—
1,969
3,959
5,205
INCHON
SEAPORT
567
793
998
8,157
OTHER
13
15
18
30
TOTAL
126,686
173,335
232,795
370,656
TOURISTS TO KOREA
YEAR
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
KOREANS
ABROAD
2,246
6,357
12,005
18,445
33,797
55,280
U.S.
7,328
11,530
30,226
41,823
55,352
63,578
JAPAN
1,825
2,280
16,873
25,219
51,711
217,287
EUROPE
1,609
1,918
3,275
5,182
8,158
10,148
TAIWAN
645
1,322
2,109
3,797
8,636
7,263
OTHER
ASIA
617
894
1,920
5,164
8,793
10,500
OTHER
840
645
1,609
3,118
6,514
6,590
TOTAL
15,110
24,946
68,017
102,748
172,961
370,646
FIGURE 6
19
TRENDS IN TOURISM
Modern Asia, August 1974
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DEFENSE TRENDS
Defense problems are among the least predictable,
but unfortunately most important, areas of projec-
tion. Our "surprise-free" projections excluded
both major war and major peace. We exclude major
wars because nuclear weapons are so devastating
that major powers are deterred from involvement
in confrontations which might escalate uncontroll-
ably; of course, this does not mean we can rest free
from fear in this regard. When we exclude major
peace, we mean that small wars continue to be
likely, and that major power tensions are very
unlikely to disappear or to become ameliorated far
beyond the present situation. This implies that
there will continue to be large markets for military
aircraft. Here it is worth noting that the recent
NATO jet fighter decision has implications for the
U.S. or the French aviation industry that could
have a ten-to-twenty year impact.
The international situations which would most
likely disprove our projection of "no major war"
would likely occur because of Middle East con-
frontation, a change in the international posture
of Japan, the disintegration of India as a nation-
state, or the disintegration of NATO's southern
flank and one or more communist takeovers in
Italy, Spain or Portugal.
It is also possible to imagine relatively large mili-
tary campaigns, such as extended anti-submarine
warfare operations, which would consume military
materiel, like wars, but which would be unlike big
wars in their effects on trade and on civilians.
Similarly a major rise in tension, for instance, in
Central Europe, might have war-like consequences
for the defense industry, including massive
increases in military spending.
Nuclear Proliferation Potential
Perhaps the international situation with the most
complex consequences for the aviation and space
industries will be nuclear proliferation. Before the
end of the century, countries like Taiwan
Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Israel, Egypt,
India, Pakistan and Iran are likely to possess at
least primitive fission weapons. Terrorist groups
may well possess, or attempt to capture, nuclear
weapons also. The net effect of such proliferation
will be to make the U.S. and other countries
terribly vulnerable and to place an enormous
premium on systems for detection of attempts to
convey nuclear weapons into the country. When
one reflects on the enormous expenditures and
organizational effort precipitated by a few aircraft
hijackings, the potential response to a nuclear
threat or to a single clandestine nuclear attack
strikes home. Truly vast expenditures for high
technology monitoring equipment and low tech-
nology interception equipment could result.
Defense Budget—Support for Aeronautical R&D
The U.S. defense budget depends upon the
international environment, which we have acknow-
ledged as unpredictable, and upon domestic
political events, which are, if anything, less predict-
able. Nevertheless, defense budgets have typically
fluctuated between five and ten percent of GNP.
The current defense budget runs about 5.6 percent
of GNP and is very unlikely to go much lower. We
would expect a gradual rise over the next few
years, with dramatic increases in the event of any
important crisis that is resolved adversely. (See
projections in Tables XI and XII.)
Historically a very large part of the income of the
U.S. aerospace industry has been from defense
products. This situation will probably continue, if
indeed the balance does not tip further towards
defense. Therefore, it is likely that the great bulk
of useful aerospace R&D will be defense-oriented,
and indeed that companies and the Congress will
find it easiest to fund new technology for defense
first; commercial applications will be largely by
spin-off. Let us consider some possibilities.
Important questions for the health of the aero-
space industry itself include the probability of long
production runs of individual aircraft or missiles
and the avoidance of a "boom-bust" economic
pattern. It would seem, then, that the aerospace
industry may have a strong interest in driving down
individual airframe costs. At present a major part
of airframe cost is avionics cost; and a major
reason for short production runs is the need to
make major airframe or engine changes to accom-
modate new avionics. A useful way out would be
accelerated development of new miniaturized
integrated electronics. It is in the direct interest of
the aerospace industry to concentrate on driving
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NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET
ACTUAL* 1939-1975; PROJECTED 1975-2000
Year
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
•1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Gross National
Product (A)
90.5
99.7
124.5
157.9
191.6
210.1
211.9
208.5
231.3
257.6
256.5
284.8
328.4 •
345.5
364.6
364.8
398.0
419.2
441.1
447.3
483.7
503.7
520.1
560.3
590.5
632.4
684.9 .
749.9
793.9
864.2
930.3
977.1
1,055.5
1,155.2
1,288.2
1,348.7
1 975 (est.) 1,431,1
National
Defense Budget (B)
1.2
2.2
13.8
49.4
79.7
87.4
73.5
14.7
9.1
10.7
13.3
14.1
33.6
45.9
48.7
41.2
38.6
40.3
44.2
45.9
46.0
44.9
47.8
51.6
50.8
50.0
50.1
60.7
72.4
78.3
78.4
74.6
71.6
74.4
74.2
78.6
85.3
B/A
%
1.3
2.2
11.1
31.3
41.6
41.6
34.7
7.1
3.9
4.2
5.2
5.0
10.2
13.3
13.4
11.3
9.7
9.6
10.0
10.3
9.5
8.9
9.2
9.2
8.6
7.9
7.3
8.1
9.1
9.1
8.4
7.6
6.8
6.4
5.8
5.8
6.0
1939.-1974 National Defense Budget figures are net
of government sales.
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, February 1974.
* Current U.S. Dollars (Billions)
TABLE XI
down the unit cost and size of electronic com-
ponents. Such advances will very possibly do more
good for the industry than will any other technical
achievement.
The next best prospect is for multi-purpose and
modular engines, as engine standardization can
drive up engine production runs and hence further
cut unit costs.
Any reduction in the unit cost of U.S. military air-
craft helps us compete in the foreign market. We
estimate that there is a good chance for U.S.
dominance of this market. At present, military sales
are a primary factor in the recycling of Arab oil
money, hence in the stability of U.S. foreign
exchange. In general, high technology (including
high arerospace technology) has been, and probably
will continue to be, the greatest source of U.S.
trade abroad. In this judgment we include the
agricultural plenty produced by an advanced
technology.
We can expect a fairly consistent development
from currently fielded military systems. This
judgment is a consequence of the long lead times
and high unit cost of military hardware. No radical
changes are very likely unless there is a war demon-
strating the bankruptcy of current concepts.
Potential Weapon System Developments
Current lines of development include greater
accuracy in all types of missiles and the prolifera-
tion of powerful surface-to-surface and air-to-
surface weapons—placing small demands upon their
launch platforms. Such weapons promise great, if
transient, military power to small nations at a low
initial cost. To counter them, we are likely to invest
heavily in tactical air defense systems, which will
possibly include destructive lasers. The most
radical technical innovations will probably be made
in tactical air defense.
The growing accuracy of strategic missiles may
encourage a change in our current deployment of
strategic missiles. Probably there will be a new
generation of mobile ICBM's; there may also be a
resurgence of interest in a combination bomber/
missile launcher. That in turn means more money
spent on precise air navigation devices.
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PROJECTED NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET
YEAR
Case 1 a
II a
I I I a
Case 1 b
II b
I I I b
Case 1 c
II c
I I I c
1975
61
63
65
92
95
97
123
126
130
1980
68
73
79
101
110
119
135
146
158
1985
75
85
96
112
128
144
149
170
192
1990
83
98
118
124
146
176
165
195
235
2000
100
133
173
150
200
260
200
265
345
Case 1 assumes GNP average growth of 2 percent/year
Case 2 assumes GNP average growth of 3 percent/year
Case 3 assumes GNP average growth of 4 percent/year
a = National Defense Budget assumed to equal 5.0% of GNP
b = National Defense Budget assumed to equal 7.5% of GNP
c = National Defense Budget assumed to equal 10.0% of GNP
(Estimates in constant 1973 dollars - Billions)
TABLE XII
The proliferation of command-guided air launched
missiles will probably mean that even more money
will be spent on various forms of ECM. Once more
this means that avionics is more significant in some
ways then is aerodynamics. Interesting ECM ideas
might include attempts to jam airborne or ground
computers. Great advances along these lines might
jeopardize military fly-by-wire.
At present there seems to be some hope in the
aerospace industry for a revival of very long pro-
duction runs through the adoption of cheap RPV's.
We would suspect that ECM will largely negate
the promise of the RPV, but will render absolutely
vital the discrimination of the pilot on the spot,
spot.
Another development of interest is the use of fields
of sensors in land combat and anti-submarine war-
fare. The sensors are typically air-delivered and
are often monitored by airborne vechicles. They
offer large opportunities both for automating
warfare and for achieving decisive results via
electronic countermeasures and deception. At the
least they will probably mean a shift to more
elaborate and expensive (and aerospace-oriented)
systems in ground combat. There may be some
large production runs of a multiservice data pro-
cessor as well.
One interesting airframe consequence of growing
attack missile accuracy may be more popularity for
VTOL/STOL aircraft, on the theory that large air
bases make inviting targets. In naval warfare,
VTOL makes possibile the protection of naval air
power without the expense of big carriers. But the
reader is cautioned that those sentiments have been
widely expressed for quite some time, without any
V/STOL boom. An important factor in the future
of military V/STOL is payload capacity. If new
developments such as the Rockwell FV12 demon-
strate that the load and speed drawbacks of pre-
vious VTOL's have been overcome, then probably
these aircraft will come to dominate the tactical
aircraft market.
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In that case there will be a demand for the
re-equipment of most tactical air fleets, (i.e., a
great surge in the international aircraft market.)
Foreign Military Needs
These general technical conclusions must be tem-
pered by a projection of U.S. and foreign military
needs in the rest of the century. We would expect
few radical political changes, except for a gradual
enrichment of the "Third World" (not the "Fourth
World" of resource-poor LDC's) via increased sales
of raw materials. Such an enrichment will quite
probably be channeled into arms procurement,
probably including nuclear arms in many cases.
The existence of a high level of armaments in any
one country of the "Third World" will almost
certainly encourage arms procurement in its
neighbors; and most of these arms are likely to
come from the U.S. and Soviet aerospace indus-
tries. Probably the rate of war in the "Third
World" will increase, and that increase will accel-
erate various arms trends already in evidence.
We project large U.S. arms sales abroad, not
because this country has some desire to enrich
itself at the expense of others, but because increas-
ingly the refusal of arms sales will be seen as a
distinctly hostile act by suppliers of vital materials.
Moreover, the performance of U.S. or Soviet
weapons in these small wars (e.g., the Middle
East War of October 1973) is the only way in
which the quality of our weapons and hence the
effectiveness of our own prices can be proved to
the other side. Ultimately it is that quality which
guarantees much of the stability of such vital
fronts as that in Central Europe. Weapon quality
is of singular consequence to a power which relies,
as we do-and the Soviets do not—on technology
in place of manpower.
Outside Europe we can expect more and more
concern for the safety of our seaborne commerce,
as we grow more dependent upon foreign suppliers.
This in turn means a larger fleet; but warships are
so expensive that no large naval expansion is
feasible unless a far cheaper approach is tried.
That returns us to the absolute need for lower
unit costs via. compact electronics, and, quite
probably, small aircraft carriers with VTOL's.
RESOURCE TRENDS
Food Supplies
When the world faces severe food shortages or
famine, the attention of the public, of politically
active elites, and of decision-makers quite naturally
becomes focused on that problem, which can
have enormous influence over the budgets of
apparently expendable programs. If the crisis
is short run the public will probably prove slow
to perceive that many of the difficulties are
actually distribution problems rather than supply
problems. But a persistent crisis, one which lasts
for many years, is likely to produce intense aware-
ness of distribution problems and lead to creation
of new programs to distribute grain and other
foods quickly to crisis areas. More generally, the
recurrence of any kind of resource shortage, due in
substantial part to a distribution problem, is likely
to produce a demand for redundancy of distribu-
tion systems. Thus areas threatened by starvation
because roads are subject to washout may demand
emergency airlift capabilities. Periodic shortages of
various kinds of materials, including food, petro-
leum and other resources, are likely to lead to
increasing demands for all kinds of stockpiles.
There may be special kinds of distribution issues
raised by the necessity for maintaining such stock-
piles and for insuring that they are useable in a
crisis.
Although many people currently believe that
rising population and rising shift in newly affluent
countries from cereals to meat imply permanent
food shortages for much of the world, Hudson's
studies indicate that food problems are probably
temporary and that such shortages as do occur in
coming years will likely result more from the
failure of distribution systems than from any
worldwide scarcity of food. Food shortages in
Africa have proved to result almost exclusively
from distribution system failures. The food short-
age of 1974 resulted in substantial part from an
unlikely combination of unwise cultivation pat-
terns in certain parts of Africa; bad weather in
China, the Soviet Union, and other places;
American production policies; windfall purchasing
by the Soviet Union; and overfishing off Latin
America. Much of the 1974 aura of doom has
already been dispelled by rising production in the
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United States, by the cancellation of Soviet and
Chinese grain orders, and by falling agricultural
prices in much of the world. Nonetheless food
shortages will recur perhaps for over a period as
long as 15 years, especially in countries such as
India and certain African countries whose dis-
tribution systems are insufficient. High petroleum
prices will, if they persist, continue to slow down
the rate of agriculatural modernization in develop-
ing nations by raising the price of fertilizer. Popula-
tion growth and shifts from grain to meat will
continue to press demands on world agriculature
upward. Nonetheless a gradual evolution of
fertilizer technologies should greatly improve the
availability of fertilizer over a period of 15 years.
Officials of the International Rice Research Insti-
tute in the Philippines believe that new strains of
rice, which are great improvements over what was
so recently called "miracle rice," provide the
technical possibility of multiplying world rice out-
put by a factor of 4 over a period of a decade; such
production would of course so far outstrip world
demand for food that an increase of this magnitude
would never occur. Systematic management of
ocean products should greatly enhance the con-
tribution aquaculture makes to world food produc-
tion as indicated in Appendix II of this report on
aquaculture. Overall, then, we project recurrent
food crises in some parts of the world for a period
of up to 15 years, but believe that food production
is likely to vastly outstrip population growth and
to rise to meet increased demands from increas-
ingly affluent populations.
Petroleum Energy Supply
All of these projections depend, of course, on the
availability of adequate energy and other materials
to feed growth at the rates indicated. The view that
adequate resources will not be available has become
widespread, based on two distinct arguments. The
first argument is that the world is expending
resources at such a rapid and accelerating rate that
by the end of this century resources of many kinds
will be exhausted. The second argument is political,
holding that other cartels will follow the lead of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and create cartels which limit the avail-
ability of materials, or raise their prices so high
that growth is slowed.
Our judgment of the first argument is that it is
based upon basic analytic errors. Most funda-
mentally, it is based upon an assumption of
"resources" as fixed quantities not subject to tech-
nological multiplication and on "pollution" as a
fixed product of economic growth not subject
to technological diminution. Using the logic of the
most forceful presentation of this first argument,
in The Limits to Growth, which projected 130
years ahead and found sudden economic collapse,
a Shell team went back 130 years and found that
the methods predicted exhaustion of resources
long before the present. (New Scientist, 27 July
1972.) Likewise, for pollution, Norman MacRae
has pointed out that an extrapolation of the
trends of the 1880s would show today's cities
buried in horse manure; in this perspective the
automobile is a highly successful pollution control
device.
We have illustrated in Figure 8, "Selected Fossil
Fuel Resources," three conservative estimates of
World and U.S. fossil fuel resources, under alterna-
tive assumptions of zero growth, 2.5 percent
growth, or 5 percent growth in world energy
demand. World petroleum at a growth rate of 2.5
percent or 5 percent can run short early in the
next century, but it seems clear that the supplies
of coal for the world and the U.S., and the U.S.
oil shale supply, will last far into the period in
which they are expected to be displaced by newer
sources of energy.
A second error of those who believe we are running
out of resources has been misunderstanding of the
concept of "proved reserves." The amount of
known energy resources at any time is not a fixed
quantity; it involves the concept of reserves, which
is an economic concept similar to that of a business
inventory. In fact, a number of different ideas
are involved in the concept of reserves. The
American Petroleum Institute distinguishes these
as follows:
"O/V in place is the amount of oil present in
known reservoirs. Proved reserves are the esti-
mated quantities of crude oil which geological
and engineering data demonstrate with reason-
able certainty to be recoverable from known
reservoirs under existing economic and operating
conditions."
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Proved reserves are bound to increase according to
the economic and operating conditions of the time.
They will be closely related to energy prices and
technology:
"Proved reserves at any time are quite distinct
from forecasts of what will be made into reserves
later. Recent discoveries in Northern Alaska
were originally said to 'contain' from 5 to 10
billion barrels. This was the amount expected to
be developed in the course of years. Eight
months later there was an implicit reserve fore-
cast, when it was announced that a pipeline
built from the area would have a capacity of 2
million barrels daily (MBD), which indicates
about 15 billion barrels forthcoming in 20 years.
It would be a mistake to compare either forecast
with proved reserves or with oil-in-place."*
Reserves of any useful resource will be somewhat
larger than the minimum needed for economic
planning. In the U.S., the reserves of oil have
historically been about 12 times annual produc-
tion; when they have fallen below this amount, it
has been a sign of incipient shortage and a future
price increase. When the ratio of reserves to pro-
duction is much larger (e.g., in the Middle East, it
is now about 70 years' reserves), it indicates that
resources will not be devoted to finding new
sources for the immediate future, since the reserves
are adequate and a shortage will not appear for a
long time. This means that it has not been possible
so far to project when oil reserves or other
resources might be exhausted. New resources and
new reserves are discovered as further investments
are made in exploration.
In sum, known energy resources seem to be ade-
quate for the reasonably foreseeable future, as we
have listed in the foregoing Figure 8.
Petroleum Energy Cost
Although there is a great deal of variation in the
prices in the 1975-1985 period depending on the
scenario, one notices that the prices tend to
cluster at the $3/barrel (in 1950 dollars) level as
one approaches 2000. The exception is the OPEC
"business-as-usual" scenario which hypothesizes
lack of production coordination among the OPEC
countries leading to a glut of world oil supply,
rapid conservation and substitution, and thus a
precipitous decline in world oil prices. Notice,
however, that if the OPEC nations learn their
lesson from this experience and are able to mili-
tarily dominate the Persion Gulf, the rapid decline
in prices in the late 1970s could serve as a sur-
rogate for the first step in an anti-Project Independ-
ence strategy. This would enable those who control
Persian Gulf supplies to once again control the
world price at high levels, with variations of price
to keep competition off balance and/or to meet
temporary internal needs.
"Petroleum Supply," Figure 9, indicates the supply
side of the above four scenarios. These indicate
that without OPEC production control, petroleum
supply should be adequate to meet future world
needs. The OPEC control scenarios indicate that
world supply would be either very unstable in the
1975-1990 period or very low throughout. In
either case it would be desirable for the U.S. to
have a fall-back position for meeting its future
fuel needs.
Nuclear Energy
Turning from petroleum to nuclear energy. Figure
10, "Selected Nuclear Energy Resources," demon-
strates that adequate nuclear fuel exists for many
years of continued growth. The problem with
nuclear energy has not been lack of fuel, but
rather difficult engineering and safety problems.
An initial phase of very optimistic projections of
U.S. nuclear power generation has passed, as
shown by Figure 11, graphing changes in official
estimates of U.S. nuclear power capacity in 1980.
However, it is not impossible that a few tech-
nological breakthroughs, together with the price
incentives provided by OPEC, will change the
longer run outlook for nuclear power. In the
meantime, the U.S. has enormous reserves of coal
which can carry it well into, and perhaps through,
the next century.
Resource Cartels
The success of the OPEC cartel and the increasing
*M.A. Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real?" Foreign Policy, 10, 1973.
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demand for other resource has raised in many
minds the question will other resources also
be subject to cartel ization. Will we indeed
have one, two, many OPECs? Our conclusion is
that petroleum is rather unique in this regard,
that most other resources will not be subject to
easy cartelization, and that there is not likely to be
any persistent or widespread shortage of raw
materials in the world during the last quarter of the
20th century. This does not mean that there will
not be temporary bottlenecks which could prove
very disruptive in the short run. Because of the
possibility of such bottlenecks it is possible that
stockpiling of various key materials may once again
be a wise policy and a policy increasingly adopted
by the U.S. government and by governments
throughout the world. We are aware that the pre-
sent trend in the United States is to diminish
stockpiles of many kinds of materials because they
are believed not to be necessary for defense, but
we also believe that an economic rationale is
substituting for the old military rationale and that
eventually some of these stockpiles—especially of
food—will be restored.
In Table XII I we provide for comparison a list of
the metals most subject to cartelization, and a
list of the metals most critical to aeronautics.
Chromium, mercury, nickel, titanium and tungsten
appear on both lists. Stockpiling and also research
on substitutes for vulnerable metals should perhaps
be a high priority task. Appendix III of this report
provides a more detailed look at the prospects for
raw materials.
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THE ELEVEN MINERALS MOST VULNERABLE
TO CARTELIZATION OR EMBARGO
MATERIAL
VULNERABILITY
INDEX PRINCIPAL OR MAJOR EXPORTERS
CHROMIUM
PLATINUM GROUP
TUNGSTEN
MANGANESE
ALUMINUM
TITANIUM
COBALT
TANTALUM
NICKEL
MERCURY
TIN
34
32
27
23
22
20
20
16
14
11
6
USSR, R. OF S.AFRICA
USSR, CANADA, R. OF S. AFRICA
CANADA, PERU
BRAZIL, GABON
JAMAICA, CANADA
AUSTRALIA, CANADA
CANADA, ZAIRE
CANADA, BRAZIL, ZAIRE
CANADA, NORWAY
CANADA, MEXICO, SPAIN
MALAYSIA, THAILAND
SOURCE: ALWYN H. KING AND JOHN R. CAMERON, "MATERIALS AND THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT," NEW DYNAMICS
OF NATIONAL STRATEGY (NEW YORK: CROWELL, 1975) p. 95.
MINERALS IDENTIFIED AS PROBABLY CRITICAL TO
AERONAUTICS, 1980-2000
ALUMINUM
*ANTIMONY
*ARSENIC
ASBESTOS
BERYLLIUM
BORON
CADMIUM
CHROMIUM
COAL
COPPER
*GALLIUM
*GERMONIUM
*INDIUM
IRON
LEAD
MAGNESIUM
MERCURY
MICA
MOLYBDENUM
NICKEL
TITANIUM
TUNGSTEN
VANADIUM
ZINC
ZURCONIUM
•AVIONICS AND RELATED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
Effect of Climate
A very predictable trend is that of long-term
climatic change. Scientists tend to agree that no
major ice age is likely to be forthcoming for a
period on the order of three to thirty thousand
years, but many believe that there is a shorter-
term current trend toward gradual cooling and
drought. If this trend continues, food short-
ages will become more probable in bad harvest
years in this century; this will require more effort
from policymakers, and will exert increasing influ-
ence over public attitudes. Food shortages have a
particularly powerful effect on public opinion even
in countries which are not particularly affected
by those shortages. In particular it seems true that
when food shortages exist people's sense of priori-
ties tends to lean rather heavily toward supply of
these basic needs at the cost of what many see
as less immediately needed projects.
Prior to the year 2000 there may be significant
changes in weather and in man's control over
weather. Here it is useful to distinguish climate
change (natural or unintended modification of
weather patterns), climate control (deliberate
alteration of major climatic patterns), and weather
modification (deliberate alteration of short-term
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weather). Various scientists have asserted that
some climate change is occurring, and in particular
have warned that the climate may become gradu-
ally colder; such possibilities are still too unproven
to constitute a basis for serious planning, but they
must be monitored because of the extraordinary
implications of ever small climate changes for food
production.1 Similarly, assertions that man-made
increases in atmospheric dust and carbon dioxide
could cause serious cooling or warming of the
earth, respectively, need monitoring but cannot be
substantiated as a basis for planning decisions at
this time. Likewise, the long-term weather effects
of the warming of rivers by power plants and the
5 to 10 degree warming of the atmosphere around
major cities may be of great (but currently un-
known) significance. When the causes of weather
patterns, and the effects of human technology
upon those weather patterns are better under-
stood, the prospects for deliberate climate modi-
fication may loom larger than they do today.
TRANSPORATION TRENDS
The standard approach to forecasting future
transportation needs is to estimate future require-
ments for various kinds of services in terms of
what people will produce, distribute and consume,
and where they will do so. This requires a systema-
tic analysis of the present and potential economic
base of the area of interest, the spatial distribution
of population, patterns of land use, and for freight,
a "base survey" which would normally include an
appraisal of natural resources, population and
labor force, and the existing and potential indus-
trial infrastructure. From this, estimates of future
transportation requirements are generated. Avail-
able transport systems are then evaluated against
existing and anticipated future requirements for
the area in question and major technological
improvements in different forms of transportation
are analyzed to select the best mix of existing
and potential future transportation modes. This
approach is illustrated in Figure 12, a typical
demand forecasting model.
In selection of the modal structure, other con-
siderations also come into play. Ecological con-
siderations are of increasing importance, as are
energy requirements. These tend to dictate the
directions which transportation evolution may
advance. Table XIV lists some of these directions
and the anticipated time period for their develop-
ment. Availability of discretionary income will
have a pronounced effect on the future of the air
transport industry. This aspect is examined in
Appendix IV of this report.
In the United States, the principal urban trans-
portation mode is the private automobile. In
modified form, to cope with environmental and
energy factors, it is expected to remain dominant,
with at least 75% of the total urban transit burden
by 1990.2 Thus no more than 25% of urban area
trips are anticipated to be handled by mass transit
in that time frame. That this will impose a tre-
mendous load on the urban and suburban highway
systems of the nation goes without saying, and
measures have been tried in many areas for many
years to divert travellers from private to public
mass transportation. Moves in that direction often
take the form of new high speed rapid transit
systems (i.e., the San Francisco B.A.R.T. and
Washington, D.C.'s new subway system.)
High Density Intercity Transportation
In developing megalopolises such as the U.S.
northeast corridor and California's San Diego to
San Francisco strip, inter-city travel is on the
upswing and systems are developed to cope with
the situation. In these instances, air and high
speed ground transportation often compete, (i.e.,
the Metroline connecting Boston, New York and
Washington, D.C., with a New York to Washington
trip time of 31/2 hours, as compared with an Eastern
Airlines shuttle flight, with an air block time of 35
1
 Cf. Harold M. Schmeck, Jr., "Climate Changes Called Ominous," The New York Times, January 19,
1975, p. 8.
2The Effects of Varying Policies and Assumption on National Highway Requirements, by D.S. Gendell
et. al., U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. Presented at Highway
Research Board Conference, Washington, D.C., January, 1973.
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DEMAND FORECASTING MODEL
PATTERNS OF LAND USE
AND
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
FUTURE SPATIAL PATTERN
OF
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
TRIP OR TRAFFIC
GENERATION
ZONAL INTERCHANGE
OR
DISTRIBUTION
MODAL CHOICE
SERVICE COST
AND
PRICE CHARACTERISTICS
ROUTE ASSIGNMENT
BY MODE
SOURCE: THE FUTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING, JOHN R. MEYER,
IN PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AND PLANNING: THE RAND
CORPORATION, JANUARY 25-27, 1971.
FIGURE 12
to 50 minutes—depending on equipment used.)
Total travel time from city center to city center
may not be too far apart, however, when rush
hour traffic departure and en route flight delays
are considered. Thus a traveller leaving New York
on a Metroliner at 9:00 a.m. would arrive in down-
town Washington at 12:30 p.m., while the same
traveller, opting for the shuttle flight, might miss
the 10:00 a.m. shuttle due to surface traffic bet-
ween Manhattan and La Guardia airport, and arrive
in Washington no sooner. Even if he makes the 10
o'clock shuttle flight, departure delays might see
him airborne at 10:30 and in the Washington area
by 11:15, but arrival delays could further slow him
so as to bring him into Washington at the same
time as the Metroliner, but considerably more
frustrated. This situation may become more
favorable for the train as the railroad roadbeds are
improved to the point where the Metroliner can
realize its full 150 mph potential. Thus in deter-
mining the modal developments of the future, the
theoretically fastest mode may be supplanted by
another which offers competitive travel time
with perhaps greater comfort and less expense.
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DIRECTIONS IN TRANSPORTATION EVOLUTION
• GASEOUS FULES IN URBAN FLEET SYSTEMS
• GROWTH OF URBAN MASS TRANSIT SYSTEMS
• ELECTRIFICATION OF CORRIDOR RAIL SYSTEMS
• GAS TURBINES IN INTERCITY TRUCKS AND BUSES
• SMALLER, LESS POWERFUL AUTOS (NO SPEED SACRIFICE)
• ELECTRIFIED MASS TRANSIT; ELECTRIC AUTOS IN URBAN
RENTAL FLEETS
• IMPROVED HIGH SPEED GROUND SYSTEMS IN CORRIDORS
• REPLACEMENT OF MODIFIED S.I., ENGINE WITH INHERENTLY
LOW EMISSION ENGINE (GAS TURBINE OR STIRLING)
• SIGNIFICANT USE OF SYNTHETIC PETROLEUM
• POSSIBLE USE OF NON-PETROLEUM FUELS IN FLEET SYSTEMS
• H2 FUEL CELLS FOR INTERCITY/RURAL AUTO
TIME FRAME
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
MID-70'S
LATE-70'S
EARLYSO'S
EARLYSO'S
MID-80's
1990
1990
2000
REFERENCE: "U.S. TRANSPORTATION-SOME ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS'
THE MITRE CORPORATION, SEPTEMBER 1971, M72-164.
BY W.E. FRAIZE,
TABLE XIV
Modal Interface
The interface between existing transportation
modes is an area where much needs to be done.
People who would use public mass transportation
of all sorts often fail to do so because they cannot
park their cars at their nearest station, nor can they .
walk because of the distance involved. Thus they
drive to work. Flying from point to point in
megalopolis areas is often frustrating, as pointed
out above, because of long surface and en route
delays. In most cases in the United States and
abroad, airports are located far from the cities they
serve or if close in, have poor surface transporta-
tion interfaces, making the city-airport travel on
both ends of a flight a time-consuming and frustrat-
ing exercise. When terminal delays at both ends of
the flight are added, it is easy to understand the
logic of the slogan "time to spare? go by air!"
International Air Travel
The growth of the Pacific Basin has important
implications for air travel. Infrastructure require-
ments will mount much faster in this region than
in others, particularly because existing levels of
infrastructure reflect the recent and frequently
continuing poverty of many regions of the Pacific
Basin. Demand for air transport of valuable elec-
tronics, art, perishable foods, and many other
categories of merchandise, is likely to continue to
rise even faster than trade itself as facilities for air
transport improve and as the possibilities of air
transport become visible to broader spectrums of
merchants. "Passenger travel in the region has been
growing at a rate of 27% a year, sharply higher
than the 7% a year in Europe, for example."*
Rising revenues for Asian air lines are listed in
Table XV.
*Seth Lipsky, "Asia Fastens the Seat-Belt," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 14, 1975, p. 53.
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IIMTRA-ASIAN REVENUE ON
TON-KILOMETRE BASIS
AIRLINE
AIR VIETNAM
CHINA AIRLINES
CATHAY PACIFIC
GARUDA
JAPAN AIRLINES
KOREAN AIRLINES
MALAYSIAN AIRLINE
SYSTEM
PHILIPPINES AIRLINES
QANTAS
SINGAPORE AIRLINES
THAI INTERNATIONAL
Average 5-Year
Growth
1969-73
(Percent)
10
37
23
19
21
106
69 (EST.i
14
13
69*
24
•GROWTH FROM MSA.
SOURCE: ORIENT AIRLINES ASSOCIATION.
TABLE XV
As the volume of East and Southeast Asian traffic
rises it will gradually come to approximate the
intensity of air traffic in Europe, and the intense
competition within the region is likely to ensure
that costs per mile drop to roughly intra-European
and transatlantic rates. This drop in costs should
in turn accelerate use of aircraft. Eventually we
anticipate that this intense, competitive, long-
range Pacific Basin air traffic will provide the
principal justification for building an SST. The
huge distances involved in Pacific travel imply
huge losses of time for executives who must
commute from the United States to Asia, from
Japan to Australia, and so forth. Typically the
executives, whose time is lost, are highly paid men
to whom a day or two wasted in trans-Pacific
flight is worth several times the current price of
an air tacket. Thus, as prosperity multiplies the
number of such executives and increases in their
salaries occur, the pressure for more rapid travel
will eventually become overwhelming—unless
Pacific Basin growth is disrupted over a long period
of time by a serious depression, or unless some
ecological or other argument of great force
absolutely prohibits SST development, or makes
it prohibitively costly.
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WORLD FUTURES
MOST PROBABLE FUTURE, 1980-2000
Our best estimate of the world, 1980-2000, is that
presented in the preceding pages, which can be
summarized as follows:
• Demographic Prospects for the United States
include development of megalopolises, lower
population densities, decentralized cities, satel-
lite cities, rebuilt inner cities, sunbelt shift,
decline of some areas.
• Development of Megalopolises in the U.S. and
developed world should proceed apace as the
trend toward suburban living continues (despite
predicted reversals from some quarters). Satel-
lite cities should develop to service far flung
suburbs while central city areas are rebuilt to
meet changing requirements. Transportation
facilities, rail, road and air should develop and
expand to meet requisite needs.
Sunbelt Shift in the U.S. will promote develop-
ment of presently sparcely populated areas such
as the Southern Piedmont, Southwest, Northern
Florida. Other quaternary areas such as the
Colorado Rockies, New England and California
mountains, beach and lake areas grow because
of their recreational potential.
• Decline Sets In in other areas such as old sea-
ports, old coal and iron mining areas, the Great
Plains, the Southern black belt as their utility
declines in the face of change. Changing shipping
methods, mechanized farming and mining
methods will create population flow towards
developing areas, largely in the sunbelt.
• Population Growth rates have been increasing at
a much slower rate than many had predicted in
the past and have begun to decline in many
areas, including the U.S. and much of the West.
It appears that we may be approaching (if we
haven't already reached) an inflection point in
the population growth curve. If the trend con-
tinues the long range effect will be stabilization
of population on a worldwide basis. This is not
likely to occur by the year 2000, but the trend
should be well established and the phantom of
world overpopulation and overconsumption of
resources laid to rest.
The Super-Industrial Society should continue
to develop and expand as the shift from primary
and secondary to tertiary and quaternary indus-
tries continues, with post-Industrial societies
emerging in the U.S. and elsewhere toward the
end of the time period. This will be accom-
panied by an accelerated industrialization of
developing countries as multinational corpora-
tions grow and expand their operations abroad,
stimulating local economies and developing
trained labor pools.
Because the principal, worldwide, social, and
economic phenomenon will be the spread of
the super-industrial society, the principal value
changes will be in the direction of industrial
values. Hard work, hierarchical organization
and saving will be the principal economic
values. Likewise, because most of the world will
consist of nations which are consolidating their
nationalism for the first time, the principal
political value will be nationalism. Despite this
in the most advanced societies, namely the U.S.,
Europe, and Japan, there will be influential
groups, including most of the intelligentsia and
the media which will espouse post-economic
values and inter-nationalist or sub-nationalist
loyalties.
Radical Political Changes are not anticipated on
any significant scale. "Third World" countries
are expected to become gradually richer through
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sale of resources and concomitant industrializa-
tion. General prosperity should prevent the rise
to power of radical elements in most instances.
At the same time, however, the new prosperity
may lead to arms races which could, in turn,
result in local wars in various parts of the world.
• GNP Growth in the U.S. and the world should
continue, but at a slightly slower pace. The U.S.
should continue its historic 3 percent yearly
growth rate for much of the period while the
world rate should average about 5.5 percent
through 1985 and decline to about 5 percent
after that. World trade should increase at a
faster rate than GNP. By 1985, the farthest out
one may predict with reasonable assurance, the
22 leading countries in the world in terms of
GNP might look as follows, within perhaps plus
or minus 20 percent.
$2000 Billion - United States
1000 Billion -Japan and U.S.S.R.
500 Billion - France and W. Germany
250 Billion-China, Canada, Italy, United
Kingdom
120 Billion - Brazil, India, Mexico, E. Ger-
many, Poland
60 Billion - Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium,
Australia, Argentina, Iran, and
perhaps Switzerland and Indo-
nesia
Today, 30 percent of the world population lives
in "rich" countries, while 70 percent live in
"poor." Applying present day standards, by the
year 2000, 66 percent of the world population
should live in rich countries and only 33 percent
in poor. This ratio might more realistically by
70:30.
• Pacific Basin Growth should accelerate drama-
tically with Japan, the U.S. (and possibly Brazil)
as spark plugs. Improvements in transportation,
communications, serve as catalysts. Tourism
should expand greatly. Growth in the region
could be explosive, with accompanying prob-
lems, but long term prospects look good.
• International Relations should stabilize as the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. normalize their relationship
and resolve cold war differences. This does not
imply entente, since basic political and economic
philosophies still differ, but neither nation is
apt to be seen as determined to dominate the
world. U.S. relations with China may also tend
toward normalization, but probably to a lesser
degree. China and the Soviet Union will probably
remain at loggerheads for the foreseeable future,
but no major armed confrontation is anticipated.
Local unrest in various parts of the world
remains probable throughout most of the
period, however.
• No major War is anticipated for the period but
numerous small wars are likely as developing
nations experience growing pains. Thus no major
peace is expected either. The possibility of large
scale confrontation will continue, however, and
could develop from
•Mid-East conflict
•Change in the international position of Japan
•Disintegration of India as a nation or of
NATO's southern flank
•Communist takeovers in Italy, Spain and/or
Portugal.
• U.S. Defense Spending should continue at the
present level in terms of percent of GNP, or at
about 5.6 percent. Recent trends have been
toward greater personnel expenditures at the
expense of new equipment and R&D. This will
probably stabilize and swing back the other way
as technological advances tend to reduce unit
and upkeep costs for equipment, freeing more
money for R&D.
• Resources should prove quite adequate, with no
serious shortages developing. New sources
coupled with more efficient use of raw materials
and development of substitutes should assure
very adequate supplies. Fears of new cartels
forming after the manner of OPEC should
prove unfounded because of the wide dispersion
of most resources coupled with market condi-
tions. OPEC itself should decline in effectiveness
rather rapidly and most probably will dissolve
or become meaningless in the next decade as
new petroleum sources develop and come on
line and substitutes become economically
competitive.
• World Energy Prices should decline over time
as oil production increases in non-OPEC areas
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and new energy sources are developed. Increased
utilization of coal, other cheap fuels should also
lower prices, but probably not to the 1972
levels.
• Air Transport growth is expected to average
about 9 percent annually for the next quarter
century, a ten-fold increase in revenue passenger
miles by the year 2000. Availability of dis-
cretionary income and projected increases in
business and leisure travel and in tourism are
the root causes. This is roughly consonant with
the ICAO projections for the period, although
arrived at by a different methodology. It is
considerably below the level which would be
reached if historic growth trends were to con-
tinue.
LESS PROBABLE FUTURES OF CONSEQUENCE
The above discussions constitute a best estimate of
the future environment of aviation. As has been
discussed, predicting future developments is at
best a very "iffy" exercise. A great number of
developments might take place, any one of which
or any combination of which could drastically
alter the course of the future. Some of these are
listed below, in random order.
• Significant changes in GWP
• More cartels form; resource prices escalate
• Collapse of the oil cartel
• Increased sale of military aircraft
• Brush fire wars in critical areas:
• Mid-East
• Southeast Asia
• Korea
• Africa
• South America
• Major political changes:
• China
• India/Pakistan
• Mid-East
• Russia
• Europe
• Japan
• Southeast Asia
• United States
• Further dramatic oil price increases
• Ecological crises—ozone layer, etc.
• Widespread famine
• Widespread plague
• Major technological developments
• New synthetic materials
• "Cheap" fuels
• New propulsion means
• New transport means
• Zeppelins
• Giant surface effect craft
• Low boys
• Major new weapons
• Death rays
• Long range lasers
• Super-accurate missiles of all sorts
• "Doomsday" devices
• High level of international tension—mobilization
• Large scale quantitative and qualitative arms
race (worldwide)
• World depression
• Great prosperity
• Suprise solutions to present development
obstacles
• Ideological revulsion against technology—
"Limits to Growth" philosophy
• Ideological hostility against government,
industry, growth, technology, taxation, etc.
It is obvious that occurrence of one of these could
logically entrain others for a cumulative effect
which would probably be much greater than
individual effects. For example, a major political
change, say a revolution in China, could bring
about a major level of international tension leading
to general mobilization on the part of several
countries. This, in turn, could lead to formation of
new cartels as suppliers take advantage of the
situation, which could in turn lead to military
action in critical areas as countries seek to secure
their supply of critical materials, and so on.
Similarly, dramatic new oil price increases could
lead to formation of new cartels, leading to overall
resource price escalation, which could bring about
a significant downward shift in GWP, which could
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cause a world depression, bringing about wide-
spread famine, which in turn—etc. Thus there are
an infinite number of events which could trigger
dramatic departures from what we have indicated
is our best estimate of the probably course of
events for the next 25 years.
Examining the above list of possibilities, certain
ones appear to stand out. These include both
optimistic and pessimistic possibilities, such as:
• High level of international tension
• Mobilization
• Large scale quantitative and qualitative
arms race
• Material shortages
• Major technological developments
• Surprise solutions to present
development obstacles
• General prosperity
It is clear that a high level of international tension
would have the effect of stimulating the defense
industries of the countries involved. With the
possibility of hostilities present, governments
would of necessity examine their nations' combat
readiness and take steps to ensure that they would
be in the strongest possible position in the event
of the outbreak of fighting. In the process, major
funds would be directed to the defense establish-
ment and R&D efforts would be stepped up
across the board. The duration of the tension
would naturally determine the degree to which
such stepped-up activities would be pursued, but
once programs were started many or most of them
would probably be carried by inertia and by econo-
mic considerations that would militate against
writing off the investment already made if results
appeared probable in a reasonable time period.
few financial restrictions would be imposed, within
the limit of available funding. Here again, R&D
of all types would increase as major efforts were
expended to plug gaps in weapon capability.
Whether or not war actually occurred, if the state
of mobilization were of long duration, R&D efforts
would be significantly stimulated and an end of the
crisis short of war would again find many projects
too far along to be summarily cancelled. It is
probable that in either of the above events, a state
of tension would continue to exist far beyond the
defusing of the specific crises which brought them
about, as was the case with the Korean War out-
break in 1950, which resulted in a major moderni-
zation of U.S. weapons systems, in particular the
air force.
A large scale qualitative and quantitative arms race
could result from a number of developments which
might fall short of either of the first two possi-
bilities. Nervousness or over-reaction of a major
power to a crisis might be sufficient to trigger such
a race which once started, would be hard to stop as
each side played catch-up in reaction to advances
by the other. Reestablishment of the cold war
could also trigger such a race, as could depressed
econimic conditions or the ascension to power of
a paraniod personality in a major nation, (i.e., a
new Hitler or Stalin).
Material shortages could come about at a result of
cartel actions, other market developments or a
de facto "Limits to Growth" situation where it is
discovered that critical resources are really in short
supply and will soon run out. Whatever the cause,
the effect would be similar. If the shortage was of
a critical material, such as petroleum or aluminum,
a major R&D effort would be required to develop
substitutes. Since in such an event the entire
economy and modus vivendi of the developed
nations of the world would be affected, it is reason-
able to assume that every effort would be made
to find a soulution.
In the event of mobilization, which traditionally is
the last step before outbreak of hostilities, it seems
reasonable to assume that the nations concerned
would shift to a war footing and focus every effort
on preparing for the outbreak of hostilities. This
would result in establishment of crash weapons
development and improvement programs on which
Major technological developments would also have
a significant effect, the degree and direction
depending on the nature of the development.
Historic examples are not hard to find. Invention
of the automobile assembly line put the nation "on
wheels," and created a major industry. The com-
puter revolutionized industry and opened up possi-
40
bilities undreamed of prior to its invention. Sputnik
precipitated the space race and all the fall-outs
resulting therefrom. Thus it is not hard to imagine
a similar development in the next quarter century,
although what form it might take and what the
results might be is a little more difficult. Should
such an event occur, however, it would certainly
act as a significant spur to many fields.
The next example, surprise solutions to present
development obstacles, is somewhat similar, since
it implies some sort of technological break-through,
but here it focuses on known situations. A cheap
new fuel might prove the solution to the current
energy crisis, for example, sparking major research
efforts to develop or adapt equipment to utilize
it. A viable means of cheaply harnessing solar
energy would also have widespread effects on the
industrial world and would stimulate the develop-
ment of pracitical uses for the new energy source.
In a situation of great prosperity, everything
benefits, not least R&D. With rapid economic
growth, availability of work reduces welfare
requirements and promotes general well-being.
Socially oriented programs would tend to lose
their emphasis as the perceived need for such
programs faded. Emphasis would be on develop-
ment and expansion of industry and strong market
competition would spur development of new
products. Consumer demand would create a large-
scale, worldwide increase in the numbers of people
who could afford air travel for business, family, or
touristic reasons, spurring the development of
improved aircraft to meet new aircraft require-
ments in every category of size and range.
Ecological considerations would loom even larger
as the economy expanded, bringing about redesign
and replacement of much equipment which con-
tributes to pollution but with which we must
presently live for economic reasons. With funds
available, the Defense Department would move to
modernize military equipment and developments
presently seen to be far down the road would
probably be advanced in time. Thus all aspects of
development, military and civilian, would benefit.
A STAGNATION OR EROSION FUTURE
The most pessimistic R&D outcomes are not those
which would result from sudden or immense dis-
aster but from what we might label "the erosion
of the West." This erosion scenario can best be
summarized by simply referring to the differences
from the best estimate scenario.
In the erosion scenario the world does not go into
an immediate deep depression but "stagflation"*
presists and deepens. The U.S. and Western Europe
and most of the Pacific Basin fail to solve their
major economic problems and as a result find
themselves locked into "stop-and-go" policies and
failure of growth similar to that which Britain has
experienced in the last decade. High rates of infla-
tion are attacked by policies which lead to high
unemployment; as soon as inflation begins to abate
slightly the various economies are reflated at a
speed which reduces unemployment rapidly but
restarts the fires of inflation. Public confidence in
industry and government declines further and
further and left-wing regimes take over in France,
Italy and Japan. These regimes make international
cooperation much more difficult but make no
more progress than their predecessors in solving the
basic economic problems. In the Pacific Basin,
instead of having a group of economies which fuel
each other in the manner of a firestorm, one finds
interdependence among stagnant, inflating econo-
mies dragging all the countries of the region down
in a vicious circle. The principal airline and ship-
builders of the region, caught by the momentum of
a decade of extraordinary expansion, find them-
selves facing bankruptcy because of excessive
capacity. In the less developed world, food short-
ages become chronic instead of being alleviated,
and birth rates, which were beginning to decline
because of the demographic transition that occurs
with increasing prosperity, instead begin to climb
once again and these higher birth rates aggrevate
low incomes and food shortages.
Throughout the world the concept of progress
through saving and technology becomes increas-
*The term stagflation refers to the present economic situation in the U.S. and the Western world in which
inflation continues in an economy which has become stagnant. This is not in consonance with historic
trends in which depression has resulted when the economy ceases to grow.
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ingly discredited, and the ideology of emphasizing
redistribution rather than growth as a solution to
world poverty, which began to coalesce as a major
ideology among the developing nations during the
early 1970s, becomes dominant throughout the
non-communist world. Lack of growth makes it
difficult to cope with pollution and other problems
of industrial society and as a result the "limits to
growth" ideology becomes more and more wide-
spread. Thus slow growth leads to attitudes which
impede growth still further and exercise particu-
larly strong inhibitions against emphasis on tech-
nology as a solution to societies' problems.
A PROSPEROUS FUTURE
An unexpectedly prosperous world recovery
from the current period of stagflation would be
unexpectedly quick and subsequent economic
growth rates would be unexpectedly rapid. Japan
would return to its previous growth rates of 10 to
12 percent per annum and carry with it South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore at
similar rates of growth and most of Southeast
Asia at rates above 6 percent per annum. Much of
Western Europe would grow at 6 to 7 percent per
annum and the United States would grow at an
annual rate of 5 percent or better. The developing
nations would take on an optimistic perspective
and emphasize growth first, for the sake of redis-
tribution later. In the developed nations growth
would provide the resources to cope with pollution
and would provide the funds for technological
change which would solve many of the key noise,
pollution, and social issues which had previously
justified the spread of anti-industrialist, anti-
growth, and anti-technological attitudes. Rapid
economic and technological progress would ensure
high morale and support high defense budgets
throughout most of the non-communist world
and thus provide the strength to ensure continu-
ation of detente with the Soviet Union. Growth
would fund technological progress and geological
exploration and as a result, rapidly relieve the
United States, and more gradually, the rest of the
world from excessive dependence upon OPEC
petroleum, thus diffusing another major source of
possible international strife. A combination of
diffuse high morale and specific technological
successes would dissipate the anti-technological
fervor that was tending to spread throughout the
west in the early 1970s.
A DESPERATION FUTURE
A deep depression could cause civil unrest in
Europe, Japan, Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
The Soviet Union could perceive such disarray
as an opportunity to spread its influence or hege-
mony and a return to a period of intense military
tension would occur. This military tension could
be expressed not only by great power rhetoric and
specific great power confrontations, but also by
specific conflict and outbreaks of warfare in the
developing world and in Europe. In consequence,
military budgets would skyrocket and R&D would
be emphasized as a necessity for survival. Tech-
nological change, particularly in high technology
industries, would proceed at rates comparable to
those which occurred during World War II and in
the middle of the cold war era.
Under these same scenarios any sense of interna-
tional cooperation would be minizedand deliberate
trouble-making would be maximized. Opponents
might very well attempt to disrupt one another's
trade and Soviet encouragement of the formation
of cartels and of a Third World emphasis on
retaining natural resources as a natural patrimony
could be expected. Because of intense fear of
resource shortages, with or without the actual
occurrence of such shortages, intense research and
development would be devoted to finding sub-
stitutes for scarce or pol i t ica l ly vulnerable
materials. The emphasis would be on those
materials vital to national defense, including energy
and the metals vital to high technology industries.
The Prospects for Foreign Competition
We would be surprised to see the United States lose
its dominant positon in the West in aerospace,
electronics and other forms of high technology
by 2000. Probably the Soviets will be our main
competition, and the Japanese may have some
effect; but we would be dubious of the competi-
tive viability of the West European industries.
This view is based on a combination of post
World War II trends and a perception of the
European attitude towards technology.
We take as a measure of national aerospace atti-
tudes, the status of the national military aero-
space industry. A very good measure of that
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industry, since 1945, has been the will and the
ability to produce independently fighter aircraft
of modern design. The requirement for such
aircraft—usually for interceptors—has been univer-
sal, and does not carry the emotional cargo associ-
ated with sophisticated bombers. At the same time
an interceptor requires for its design and produc-
tion the most sophisticated aerospace products;
only a healthy industry can produce a good fighter.
To some extent this view of fighters as indicators
of the prestige and power of aerospace industries
is confirmed by the actions of a number of the
lesser powers. At var ious times since 1945,
Argentina, Egypt, India, and Spain have regarded
native fighter-production capabi l i ty as an
important measure of national prestige.
In 1945, virtually every nation in Western Europe
had the independent capacity to design and build
fighters. The design process was relatively simply,
and construction was cheap. The maintenance of
an independent military aircraft R&D establish-
ment entailed no great sacrifices. One might say
that the cost of entry into the aerospace arms
industry was low. Each country has attained a
substantial manufacturing capacity, but that has
been used to manufacture aircraft of foreign—
often U.S.—conception. Choices between indi-
genous capacity and economy seem generally to
have been decided in favor of economy, as long as
the numbers of factory jobs remain.
As this capacity has been allowed to die, the
initial cost of starting up a serious military air-
craft industry has risen. Decisions which may have
seemed quite temporary have become less and less
reversible. A good illustration of this cost pheno-
menon may be Japan's efforts to produce her own
combat aircraft. Her own, quite modest light-
weight fighter has virtually prices itself out of her
military budget, although Japan is still capable of
buying U.S. Phantoms.
One can see similar trends in other arms indus-
tries requiring a high research investment. Most
European effort has gone into the development of
relatively simple tactical missiles, a notable export
success being the French Exocet naval missile.
To these countries we must contrast the Soviets.
Quite obviously the Soviets, however expensive or
ineffective their weapons, cannot buy U.S. equip-
ment. They must maintain a powerful indigenous
capacity, which means that for the foreseeable
future they will probably be our chief competitors
in selling aerospace products to the neutral world.
Until very recently the Soviets have regarded such
sales as a way of influencing the buyers. They have
often very nearly given away equipment made
surplus by their huge production runs. At the same
time their product has been unattractive to poten-
tial paying customers because of serious inade-
quacies in post-sales support: there has, for
example, been no serious Western market for
Soviet airliners. This may no longer be entirely the
case. For example, the Soviets have made strenous
efforts to market their recent commercial aircraft
in non-Communist countries; but inherent deficien-
cies continue at present to plague them (e.g.,
Egyptian dissatisfaction with the TU 154).*
The Soviet Union has, and for quite some time is
likely to have, an underdeveloped civilian economy
in great need of hard foreign currency. Her major
manufactured export, beyond her own client states,
is arms, and recently she has begun to ask realistic
prices for this product, as during the October
(1973) war. If the Soviets can succeed in depoliti-
cizing this product, we can expect them to try very
hard to sell it at commercial prices throughout the
neutral or semi-neutral world.
Of course, the Soviet military industry provides
them a base for the development of commercial
aircraft; and here we are beginning to see serious
sales activity. An interesting correlate of such
attempts may be a decline in the security-mania
of the Soviet military.
These are all trends which are only beginning in
1975, but we would expect them to be well
established by 2000. That is:
In most countries the choice of high-technology
products will be U.S. vs. Soviet. Europeans will
participate heavily in high-technology programs,
* Aviation Week, 16 December 1974, p. 13.
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but they will initiate few of them; one might take
some of the IBM projects as prototypes. The lower
the entry cost, the better the chance that a class of
indigenous R&D will exist in a European nation,
but European governments are likely to be most
interested in the manufacturing end of high tech-
nology.*
However, certain countries, for reasons of prestige,
will attempt to maintain entirely indigenous high
technology industries. Probably such attempts will
involve such denials of technological reality as
protected (if inferior) arms industries.
The Japanese are a separate, and ambiguous, case.
Japan has deemphasized military and aerospace
technology for a generation, but has demon-
strated high and increasing capability to produce
high technology. Presently they manufacture, but
do not devote much effort to developing, aero-
space technology. Superficially this resembles the
European pattern, but the superficiality of the
resemblance is crucial, for in other areas the
Japanese have demonstrated the will and creativity
to develop their own products, and even to exceed
the U.S. in key areas, whereas the Europeans
generally have not. Nonetheless, because of the
long lead-times involved in creating a base for
aerospace research and development, because of
the continuing inhibit ions on most military
research, and because Japaneses sensitivity about
exporting armaments increases their net R&D
costs, the Japanese are unlikely to be major com-
petitors of the U.S. before the end of the century.
*That is, the less government effort is required, the better the chance that some private company will go
into high technology. Hence one would expect a decline in European technology as European economies
became socialized, as may occur in the U.K. This would be a cultural, not in fact an economic, pheno-
menon. The most likely way of reversing such a trend would be a strong anti-U.S. and pan-European
political movement, i.e., a national ^ combination which would have no choice but to support strong
indigenous R&D. Such a combination seems unlikely at present.
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POSSIBLE IMPACT
ON
AVIATION GROWTH
During the course of the study, a number of factors
have been indentified which should have an effect
on the future growth of aviation. In this section
some of these are examined. For purposes of
discussion they have been divided into three basic
categories: those which should have the effect of
promoting aviation growth; those which might
tend to restrain growth; and those which should
affect the future of aviation but which do not
clearly fall into either of the above categories.
Factors Promoting Growth
Growth of the Pacific Basin—As has been dis-
cussed, the anticipated growth in the Pacific Basin
over the next 25 years should have a significant
impact on aviation growth. In addition to the
obvious increase in air travel fostered by the
spectacular growth in tourism in the region and
the dramatic increase in air freight, the market for
all kinds of aircraft, from transports to agricultural
aircraft should be significant. As oil exploration
expands in the area, for example, helicopters are
increasingly required to service off-shore oil rigs
and remote exploration sites. As commerce and
industry expand, so does the demand for business
aircraft. While some home-grown aircraft manu-
facturing may be anticipated, notably in Brazil,
the U.S. aviation industry can expect the lion's
share of the new business since we build better
aircraft in most categories and generally sell them
for less. Even in the case of Brazil, U.S. manu-
facturers benefit by assisting in development of
local industries which manufacture U.S. designs
under license. In view of the cost of design and
development of new aircraft, this pattern may
be expected to continue in those countries which
attempt to develop their own aviation industries.
Intercity Transportation--With the growth of
megalopolises in the U.S. and the concomitant
growth in travel among and within the city centers,
growth of supplementary transportation systems
may be expected. One of the more obvious
approaches would be utilization of STOL or
V/STOL aircraft operating from STOL strips at or
near city centers. One such system operates bet-
ween Montreal and Ottowa at present and provides
city center to city center service which is signi-
ficantly better than competing modes.* Develop-
ment of such a system within the Northeast
corridor, for example, would itself create a signi-
ficant market for STOL transport aircraft which
could provide a highly competitive alternative to
existing systems such as the Eastern Airlines
Shuttle and the Metroliner. Continued develop-
ment of wide-bodied, short-range aircraft of the
Lockheed 1011 variety for intercity and inter-
megalopolis utilization may also be anticipated,
as travel demand grows and existing facilities
prove inadequate. Increased utilization of business
aircraft may also be expected, particularly as indus-
try continues its trend toward decentralization of
facilities and relocation in suburban areas.
Population and Economic Growth—As has been
discussed, we believe that the rate of increase of
population growth in the United States is turning
downward and may have already reached or
dropped below the no-growth point. It was also
pointed out, however, that the population will
continue to increase despite this until the present
*"Total travel time, door to door between comparable downtown hotels in each city, involved 2 hours 35
minutes by bus, 2 hours 24 minutes by train, 2 hours 20 minutes by automobile, 2 hours by conventional
aircraft (DC-9 with a 30 minute block time between existing airports) and fess than 90 minutes by an
Airtransit Twin Otter (with 45 minutes block time between STOL ports)." Davidson, Vic, "Canadian
STOL-Commuter Service Demonstrates Early Success," ICAO Bulletin, December, 1974, p. 14.
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bulge advances past the child-bearing age
(Figure 2). This will not occur before the end of
the century. Thus an increasing population will
require more transportation facilities of all types,
including aviation. When this is coupled with the
expanding economy, with its accompanying
increase in personal disposable income, it is clear
that there will be an increase in the demand for
services of all sorts, including transportation.
Economic growth should thus promote growth in
the aviation industry as demand increases for all
types of aircraft from small private planes to large
transports.
Defense—The impact of defense considerations on
the aviation industry has been discussed. Despite
the ongoing detente, it is highly unlikely that
defense spending, and aviation's proportion thereof,
will decline in the next 25 years. Events in South-
east Asia serve to underscore this. It is quite possi-
ble, if not probable, that a dramatic increase in
defense spending may develop in the future as a
result of communist gains in various parts of the
world and the perceived danger to our security
relating thereto. Thus Sir Robert Thompson, in
reference to Congressional refusal to vote more
aid for South Vietnam, "Now, for the sake of
$1 billion or $2 billion, it will cost the United
States $50 billion to $100 billion more annually
in defense costs if credibility is to be restored."*
This is probably an extreme view, but the trend
suggested remains a possibility, although not
necessarily at the levels predicted. Thus, it seems
likely that defense requirements will continue to
stimulate the aviation industry for the next quarter
century.
Desperation—The Desperation World scenario was
discussed earlier and its effects on aviation high-
lighted. Although this would be a very unpleasant
world in which to live, it would prove very stimula-
tive to aviation, especially in connection with
military technology and research. In such a world
the aerospace industry, in common with other
defense-oriented industries, would be operating
under what would amount to wartime conditions
in terms of emphasis on production and develop-
ment. Civil aviation growth would probably not be
markedly enhanced and might indeed be restricted,
but the growth on the military side would probably
more than offset any losses in civil aviation growth.
Developments—Some of the developments which
might lead to an increase in aviation growth have
been discussed in some detail. Thus they will be
listed here as indicative of the type of occur-
rences which, while often highly undesirable other-
wise, would probably lead to a marked expansion
of the aviation industry.
• High level of international tension
• Mobilization
• Large-scale quantitative and qualitative
arms race
• Material shortages
• Major technological developments
• Surprise solutions to present
development obstacles
• General prosperity
Agriculture— It seems reasonable to expect that
as developing nations expand their agricultural
production the airplane will become increasingly
important, both for distribution and for spraying.
As new agricultural methods are introduced in
developing nations, large-scale cooperative farming
operations often develop to take maximum advan-
tage of economies of size. In such cases, traditional
hand methods of sowing, weeding, fertilizing and
harvesting generally must be discarded. Use of
modern farming equipment is often limited because
of cost, inability to properly operate and maintain
the equipment and, frequently, terrain character-
istics which limit such use. Aircraft, however, can
often do the bulk of the necessary jobs, freeing
available manpower to handle those tasks which
cannot be done from the air. The versatility,
relatively low cost and tremendous productivity
of aircraft, both in the dusting and logistics roles,
would appear to assure a profitable future for the
light aircraft industry in the years to come. This
optimism does not, of course, mean that aircraft
*Thompson, Robert, "Retreat," Op. Ed. Page, the New York Times, April 3, 1975. Of course, there is
serious doubt that another $1 or $2 billion would have been enough to maintain the credibility of U.S.
commitment.
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will soon become profitable for high density crops
like rice in the extremely poor areas (China, India,
etc.) which constitute most of the third and fourth
worlds, except as means of distributing the pro-
duce where the existing transportation infrastruc-
ture is inadequate for the job.
Weather Modification—The impact of weather
modification on aviation is somewhat indirect but
could prove significant. If means of dissipating fog
are developed, for example, it would result in
elimination or drastic reduction in down time for
airports in areas subject to fog. Means of diverting
or limiting snow and hail could have similar results,
as could hurricane diversion or modification. In
addition, development of weather modification
techniques could create new uses for aircraft
perhaps resulting in new designs and production of
significant numbers of weather modification air-
craft. Such techniques would probably spread
quite rapidly, particularly in developing countries
with food shortage problems, creating a worldwide
market for weather modification aircraft.
Civilian Aviation requirements are likely to have a
beneficial effect on aviation, especially in a climate
of prosperity. Emphasis is likely to be placed on
development of quieter, cleaner, more economical
and efficient power plants. New materials and con-
struction techniques are also apt to be highlighted
as cost reducing factors. Automation of airway
traffic control systems is another probability,
coupled with development of cheaper, more
efficient and more reliable avionics components
for the general aviation market. STOL and
V/STOL developments are very likely to come
along in the next few years, creating new markets
and expanding existing ones. Air cushion vehicles,
while not strictly aircraft, are likely to be
developed and produced by aviation firms and
their future appears rather bright as obstacles to
their design and development are overcome.
Factors Constraining Growth
Just as there are foreseen factors which should
tend to promote aviation growth, there are some
which might tend to have the opposite effect.
Some of these are briefly discussed below.
Decline in development and production might be
brought about by a general and prolonged econo-
mic recession or depression or by long-term econo-
mic stagnation which produce close to a zero
growth rate. In such a situation, the general effect
would be to cut back on all unessential activities
and to ride out the storm as well as possible.
Should such an economic climate persist for a
protracted period, it would doubtless have a long
term depressing effect on aviation development
and would probably seriously damage the indus-
try. In this environment, it is hard to foresee any
significant progress being made.
Institutional Factors which could adversely affect
the aviation industry might include increased and
repressive government regulation which could
stifle the industry. The ascendance of a "limits to
growth" philosophy might result in imposed
restrictions on the degree and type of development
which would be permitted, which could have the
effect of reducing new developments to the vanish-
ing point. Basic changes in the U.S. political/
economic structure, that is, a shift from tradi-
tional support for investment, research and develop-
ment, and increases in productivity, to an increased
emphasis on redistribution and social welfare,
could retard econimic progress and lead to a
decline in the aviation industry as well as others.
(Such a shift can take place with or without
increased direct government control of the
economy.)
Material shortages could have a very restrictive
effect on aviation growth if substitutes could
not be developed. The most obvious is a shortage
of fuel, which could seriously curtail flying activi-
ties of all sorts. Materials critical to aircraft pro-
duction, such as metals, minerals, fibers, petro-
chemical products sould also prove restrictive to
development if in short supply, if no viable sub-
stitutes were to be developed. Such shortages
might be produced by source restrictions, by
diversion of available supplies to other use areas,
or by cartel actions designed to force prices up.
Whatever the cause, the effect could be extremely
deleterious to aviation development.
Improved Ground Transport might well lead to a
reduction in the aircraft market through provision
of cheaper and/or more efficient transportation.
Thus, improvements in existing mass transit sys-
tems, such as the Metroliner in the Northeast
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Corridor, might lead to a decline in systems, such
as the Boston-New York-Washington Air Shuttle.
New systems might be developed and super-
imposed on the existing transportation infrastruc-
ture with the same effect as development of high
speed hydrofoils and surface effect machines.
Development of automated highways, making it
possible to travel long distances rapidly and safely
in private automobiles could also adversely affect
aviation growth. Although it is not likely that
surface transportation will seriously challenge
long-haul aviation, especially for passenger move-
ment, it is possible that much of the short-and
medium-haul market could be captured by future
surface transportation developments.
Other Factors Affecting U.S. Aviation
There are several other factors which might affect
U.S. aviation development in a manner less easy
to identify than the above; (i.e., they could pro-
duce either adverse or beneficial results, depending
on the way in which they developed.) Three of
these are discussed below.
Foreign Competition could prove to be either a
stimulus or a serious challenge to the U.S. aviation
industry. Although the U.S. presently dominates
the world civil aviation market and more, than
holds its own in the military, this could change in
the future either because of competition develop-
ing in the Western world, the communist world or
both. It doesn't appear that such competition will
develop to the point where the U.S. industry
could be seriously hurt, but rapid expansion of
world markets could lead to expansion of foreign
industries to fill the void, which limits to U.S.
production couldn't fill, thus creating a competi-
tive base which presently doesn't exist. It is also
possible that another country could achieve a
major technological or production breakthrough
which would enable it to corner a significant por-
tion of the market before the U.S. industry could
develop a matching capacity. A third possibility
is a major effort by communist countries, U.S.S.R.
in particular, to undercut U.S. market dominance
by flooding the market with cheap but good air-
craft of various types which would significantly
undersell competitive U.S. models. Such a possi-
bility becomes more likely if the technology
transfer trend develops, affording the Soviets
technological capabilities they presently lack. A
precedent exists in the automotive field where
Fiat constructed auto plants in the U.S.S.R. and
trained Soviet workers in their operation. Today
U.S.S.R.-built Fiats undersell Italian versions in
several European and African markets.
On the other hand, competition has historically
promoted industrial expansion and product im-
provement and there is no reason to believe that
this wouldn't continue to be the case in the avia-
tion industry. Development of significant foreign
competition might very well prove a stimulus to
U.S. aviation, promoting the growth of the
industry.
Ecology has become increasingly significant of
recent years and has had a market effect on the
aviation industry. Thus the focus on cleaner,
quieter, more efficient power plants, the demise
of the U.S. SST and the current efforts to ban
foreign SSTs from U.S. airports and airways.
Here too, it is difficult to say what will be the
long-term effects of ecological considerations on
the aviation industry. That they can be restrictive
is clear from the SST and from various prohibi-
tions to aircraft operations which have been
ikposed from time to time, and place to place. On
the other hand, aviation has unquestionably
advanced as a result of such developments as more
efficient and quieter power plants. While ecological
considerations might combine to produce a restric-
tive effect on aviation developments (or a serious,
long term effect such as deterioration of the ozone
layer in he upper atmosphere could result in
serious curtailment of flight activities), the likeli-
hood is that as ecological dangers are identified,
technological advances will serve to alleviate or
negate them, permitting the industry to grow to
meet future demands.
Energy is clearly an area which could prove quite
critical to future developments of all kinds. If
there were to develop a serious shortage of petro-
leum products, for whatever reason, aviation would
be adversely affected, since it would be difficult
to convert aircraft to alternatives such as coal
synthetics or methane. Since many manufacturing
facilities are dependent on petroleum products
(including natural gas), production would also
be curtailed until such time as conversion to coal
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could be made or coal liquefaction and gasification
techniques developed to the point of providing
for requirements. Shortages of other energy
sources could have similar effects. Development of
substitute fuels, such as hydrogen, for aircraft
utilization are anticipated to take considerable
time, on the order of one to two decades. When
this is coupled with the need to design and pro-
duce power plants capable of using the new fuels,
the time and investment required becomes very
large. A serious energy shortage could clearly
cripple industry, in general, and aviation in
particular for the rest of this century, should it
develop. On the other hand, known reserves of
all types are more than adequate to handle pro-
jected needs well into the next century, and when
new source discoveries are added, it seems clear
that de facto energy shortages, if they develop,
will be man-made. Hence, they can be alleviated
by appropriate action. The most probable develop-
ment in the energy picture is pursuit of Project
Independence goals to the point of U.S. energy
partial self-sufficiency within one or two decades.
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ATTACHMENT I
PACIFIC BASIN AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
TRENDS 1972-2000
We highlight the prospects for Pacific Basin
development because we belive that is is the area
of most dynamic development for the last quarter
of the century. The large travel and transport
distances imply significant increases in aviation
needs to meet the special requirements of the
area, such as the SST.
The last chart shows development in Europe and
the developing countries for comparative purposes.
International Development Projections
This section focuses on development projections
for the Pacific Basin Trading and Investment Area.
The Pacific Basin Trade and Investment Area is
a functional group of "key countries" contained
in or bordering on the Pacific Ocean. Included in
this grouping are Venezuela and Brazil which,
while not geographically located in the Pacific
Basin, do a major portion of their trading with
the PTIA, and thus, constitute a significant factor
in the growth and development of the region.
Also shown are projections for he China Trading
Bloc and for comparison, some European and
third world projections.
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PACIFIC BASIN
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, GNP/CAP, AND POPULATION PROJECTIONS
BY COUNTRY AND REGION - ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) 1972-2000
(GNP FIGURES IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLAR EQUIVALENT)
COUNTRY/REGION
U.S.A.
JAPAN
CANADA
AUSTRALIA
BRAZIL
MEXICO
INDONESIA
SOUTH KOREA
NEW ZEALAND
PHILIPPINES
TAIWAN
THAILAND
SINGAPORE
GNP (BIL.)
GNP/CAP.
POP. (MIL)
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/GAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
1972
1155
5532
209
335
3165
105
103
4696
22
50
3924
13
49.5
495
98
40
750
53
10.6
10
294
9.5
3359
2.9
8.3
202
41
7.69
508
15
7.7
195
38
2.6
1200
2.1
%
2.0
1.5
1.0
6.0
5.2
1.2
3.0
2.1
1.7
2.5
1.8
2.0
6.0
4.8
2.8
4.0
3.0
3.4
4.0
7.0
4.8
2.5
1.5
1.7
5.5
2.0
3.5
6.0
3.5
2.2
5.0
3.0
3.3
9.0
6.7
2.3
1975
1225
5750
215
399
3685
110
113
4998
23
53.8
4140
14
59.0
570
105
45
820
59
11.9
11.6
338
10.2
3512
3.1
9.8
214
45
9.2
563
16
8.9
213
42
3.4
1500
2.2
%
4.5
3.5
1.0
9.0
7.9
1.1
5.0
3.3
1.7
5.0
2.9
2.1
8.0
5.1
2.9
7.5
4.1
3.4
5.5
9.0
6.6
4.0
2.2
1.8
5.5
2.0
3.5
9.0
5.8
2.2
6.5
3.4
3.1
9.0
6.7
2.3
1980
1527
6830
226
614
5390
115
144
5879
25
68.7
4776
16
86.7
730
120
65
1002
70
15.6
17.9
465
12.4
3915
3.4
12.8
236
53
14.2
746
18
12.2
252
49
5
2200
2.5
%
4.2
3.2
1.0
8.0
7.2
0.8
5.0
3.4
1.6
5.0
3.0
2.0
8.0
5.2
2.8
7.5
4.2
3.3
7.0
9.0
6.7
4.5
2.6
1.9
6.0
2.6
3.4
8.0
6.0
2.0
6.5
3.5
3.0
9.0
6.9
2.1
1985
1876
7995
238
902
7630
120
184
6949
27
87.7
5537
18
127.4
940
140
93
1230
82
21.9
27.9
644
15.5
4451
3.7
17.1
268
63
20.9
998
20
16.7
300
57
8
2900
2.8
%
4.0
3.1
0.9
7.0
6.2
0.8
5.0
3.5
1.5
6.0
4.1
1.9
8.0
5.4
2.6
7.0
4.0
3.0
8.0
8.0
6.0
5.0
3.2
1.8
6.5
3.6
2.9
7.5
5.8
1.7
7.0
4.3
2.7
8.6
7.2
1.8
1990
2282
9315
249
1265
10310
125
235
8253
29
117.4
6769
20
187.2
1222
160
130
1497
95
32.2
40.4
862
19.8
5210
4
23.4
320
73
30
1323
22
23.4
370
65
12
3900
3.1
%
4.0
3.2
0.8
6.0
5.3
0.7
5.0
3.6
1.4
6.0
4.2
1.8
8.0
5.7
2.3
7.0
4.3
2.7
8.0
7.5
6.0
6.0
4.3
1.7
7.0
4.5
2.5
7.5
6.2
1.3
7.0
4.6
2.4
7.0
5.6
1.4
2000
3378
12765
270
2265
17280
135
383
11755
33
210.3
10214
25
404
2130
200
256
2280
125
69.5
83.3
154.4
35.5
7938
5
46
497
93
61.8
2414
25
46
580
82
23
6400
3.6
SOURCE OF GNP DATA: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, GROWTH RATES AND TREND DATA BY REGION AND COUNTRY-RC-N-138,
MAY 1, 1974, BUREAU OF PROGRAM AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, A.I.D.
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PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT - STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
(EQUIVALENT 1972 DOLLARS, BILLIONS)
COUNTRY
AUSTRALIA
INDONESIA
JAPAN
SINICULTURE AREA
CHINA (TAIWAN)
KOREA (SOUTH)
SINGAPORE
SOUTH VIETNAM
OTHER ASIA
MALAYSIA
1972
50.00
10.62
335.00
21.00*
7.69
10.00
2.60
3.13
28.00*
4.25
GROWTH
RATE (%)
3.5
5.0
7.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
6.4
8.3
10.1
6.5
8.0
9.5
7.0
9.0
11.0
7.0
9.0
11.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
4.7
5.6
6.5
5.5
6.3
7.0
YEAR
1975
55.44
57.88
61.25
12.29
12.65
13.01
399.00
422.00
445.89
25.30
26.68
28.03
9.29
9.69
10.10
12.25
12.95
13.66
3.19
3.37
3.56
3.73
3.95
4.19
32.14
32.97
33.82
5.55
5.76
5.96
1980
65.85
73.87
85.91
15.69
16.93
18.25
533.95
620.00
718.11
34.50
39.75
45.35
12.73
14.24
15.90
17.18
19.93
23.02
4.47
5.19
6.00
4.33
4.81
5.34
40.44
43.30
46.34
7.25
7.82
8.35
1985
78.21
94.28
120.49
20.02
22.66
25.60
714.55
911.00
1156.52
47.05
59.22
73.37
17.44
20.92
25.03
24.10
30.66
38.79
6.27
7.99
10.11
5.02
5.85
6.82
50.88
56.86
63.49
9.48
10.62
11.72
1990
92.89
120.33
168.99
25.55
30.32
35.91
956.23
1338.56
1862.59
64.16
88.23
118.70
23.89
30.74
39.40
33.80
47.17
65.36
8.79
12.29
17.04
5.82
7.12
8.70
64.01
74.67
86.99
13.07
15.34
17.58
2000
131.03
196.00
332.43
41.62
54.30
70.64
1712.46
2889.85
4831.08
115.31
195.84
310.69
44.84
66.37
97.64
66.49
111.67
185.58
17.29
29.09
48.38
7.82
10.55
14.18
101.32
128.59
163.29
21.16
26.58
32.32
•ESTIMATED
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PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT - STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
(EQUIVALENT 1972 DOLLARS, BILLIONS)
CONTINUED
COUNTRY
NEW ZEALAND
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CANADA
CHILE
MEXICO
UNITED STATES
VENEZUELA
1972
9.50
11.00
7.70
27.20
49.50
103.00
7.68
40.00
1155.00
13.41
GROWTH
RATE (%)
2.5
3.5
4.0
5.0
5.5
6.0
5.0
6.5
8.0
2.5
3.7
5.0
5.0
5.5
6.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.5
9.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
5.9
6.5
YEAR
1975
10.20
10.50
10.69
12.73
12.92
13.10
8.91
9.30
9.70
29.29
30.33
31.49
57.30
58.12
58.96
112.55
115.86
119.24
8.39
8.64
8.89
47.64
49.69
51.80
1225.70
1262.10
1299.22
15.52
15.93
16.20
1980
11.54
12.50
13.01
16.25
16.89
17.59
11.37
12.75
14.25
33.14
36.37
40.19
73.13
75.96
78.90
130.48
140.96
152.18
9.73
10.51
11.35
63.75
71.34
79.70
1353.27
1463.12
1580.17
19.81
21.22
22.20
1985
13.06
14.85
15.83
20.74
22.07
23.54
14.51
17.46
20.94
37.49
43.62
51.29
93.33
99.28
105.59
151.26
171.50
194.22
11.28
12.79
14.49
85.31
102.45
122.63
1494.12
1696.16
1922.52
25.28
28.26
30.42
1990
14.73
17.64
19.26
26.47
28.84
31.50
18.52
23.92
30.77
42.42
52.31
65.46
119.12
129.75
141.30
175.35
208.66
247.88
13.08
15.56
18.49
114.16
142.04
188.68
1649.62
1966.31
2339.04
32.26
37.64
41.68
2000
18.92
24.88
28.51
43.12
49.26
56.41
30.17
44.91
66.43
54.30
75.23
106.63
194.03
221.63
253.05
235.66
308.87
403.77
17.58
23.03
30.12
204.44
292.75
446.67
2010.28
2642.56
3462.35
52.55
66.77
78.24
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PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA - STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTIONS
1975 - 2000
(EQUIVALENT 1972 DOLLARS)
COUNTRY
AUSTRALIA
INDONESIA
JAPAN
SINICULTURE AREA
CHINA (TAIWAN)
KOREA (SOUTH)
SINGAPORE
SOUTH VIETNAM
OTHER ASIA
CAMBODIA
LAOS
1972
3924
84
3165
283*
508
294
1200
225a
269*
111a
80
PROJECTION
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
YEAR
1975
4164
4288
4674
85
88
89
3717
3987
4259
338
372
409
571
605
640
337
364
391
1389
1512
1641
228
235
247
285
299
311
96
110
121
77
82
85
1980
4597
4971
6255
87
95
98
4858
5858
6985
405
491
595
695
810
940
422
520
630
1773
2222
2765
233
252
288
304
335
364
84
111
136
73
86
94
1985
5076
5763
8371
89
102
108
6349
8607
11455
490
653
873
846
1084
1381
528
743
1015
2263
3265
4659
238
270
336
324
375
428
75
112
152
73
90
104
1990
5604
6661
11202
94
110
119
8298
12647
18532
617
926
1395
1029
1451
2096
664
1062
1732
2930
4797
7851
246
289
395
351
432
522
64
113
173
73
95
115
2000
6831
8952
20061
104
128
145
14174
27304
48506
903
1698
3281
1523
2599
4827
1051
2169
4701
4911
10356
22292
256
332
547
397
541
721
52
115
212
73
105
140
"1969 a= ESTIMATED
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PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA - STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
(EQUIVALENT 1972 DOLLARS)
CONTINUED
COUNTRY
MALAYSIA
NEW ZEALAND
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CANADA
CHILE
MEXICO
UNITED STATES
VENEZUELA
1972
457
3359
202
195
1095
495
4696
795
750
5532
1166
PROJECTION
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED. GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.
YEAR
1975
487
502
513
3481
3575
3607
212
214
220
205
216
227
1135
1183
1232
522
535
544
4867
5042
5192
809
837
874
810
849
898
5871
6045
6187
1194
1230
1267
1980
554
599
636
3695
3875
4061
229
237
252
221
255
293
1205
1345
1499
571
608
637
5166
5677
6136
834
917
1023
921
1042
1214
6482
7008
7455
1243
1345
1454
1985
630
715
789
3922
4287
4572
248
261
289
240
301
377
1279
1529
1823
624
691
746
5484
6392
7253
859
1003
1197
1047
1280
1639
7156
8124
8994
1293
1470
1670
1990
716
853
991
4204
4632
5173
269
289
332
260
361
493
1357
1738
2218
682
786
873
5821
7197
8572
885
1095
1402
1191
1573
2215
7901
9418
10825
1346
1608
1955
2000
926
1215
1564
4831
5537
6622
315
352
438
304
519
842
1529
2247
3284
816
1016
1196
6558
9123
12328
940
1310
1920
1539
2373
4042
9631
12657
15718
1458
1922
2679
•1969
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IMPORTS FROM PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS
PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES/REGION- EASTERN SECTOR
INDONESIA
SINICULTURE AREA
JAPAN
OTHER ASIA
AUSTRALIA
1964 1967 1970 1975 1980 1985
YEAR
1990 1995 2000
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IMPORTS FROM PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS
PRINCIPAL COUNTIRES/REGIONS-WESTERN SECTOR
(EEC AND OLA SHOWN FOR COMPARISON)
CANADA
MEXICO
VENEZUELA
EEC
U. K.
U.S.
CHILE
BRAZIL
OTHER LATIN AMERICA
ARGENTINA
1964 1967 1970 1975 1980
YEAR
1985 1990 1995 2000
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EXPORTS TO PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES/REGIONS - EASTERN SECTOR
INDONESIA \
SINICULTURE AREA
OTHER ASIA
JAPAN
v
 AUSTRALIA
I I I
1964 1967 1970 1975 1980
YEAR
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EXPORTS TO PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES-WESTERN SECTOR
(EEC AND OLA SHOWN FOR COMPARISON)
CANADA
MEXICO
OTHER LATIN AMERICA
EEC EEC
U.S.
VENEZUELA
BRAZIL
CHILE
ARGENTINA
U.K.
1964 1967 1970 1975 1980
YEAR
1985 1990 1995 2000
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CHINA BLOC TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
SUMMARY
POPULATION (MILLIONS)
1970
835.61*
YEAR
1975
909.20
923.47
924.23
1980
984.82
1010.92
1022.54
1985
1062.06
1107.88
1131.27
1990
1149.79
1214.36
1251.40
2000
1347.58
1413.31
1531.52
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (EQUIVALENT 1972 DOLLARS, Bl LLIONS)
1970 ADJ
126.40*
1975
154.10
169.15
185.57
1980
187.73
226.42
272.52
1985
228.88
303.11
400.13
1990
279.14
406.01
587.92
2000
415.18
728.48
1269.28
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA (EQUIVALENT 1972 DOLLARS)
1970 ADJUSTED PROJECTION
151.00* LOWGNP-HIGH POP.
MED GNP-MED. POP.
HIGH GNP-LOWPOP.
1975
167.00
183.00
204.00
1980
184.00
224.00
277.00
1985
202.00
274.00
376.00
1990
227.00
340.00
518.00
2000
277.00
522.00
982.00
'ESTIMATE
CHINA BLOC TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
POPULATION - STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
(MILLIONS)
Country
China (PRC)
North Korea
North Vietnam
1970
800.00*
13.61*
22.00*
Growth
Rate
1.7
2.0
2.0
2.4
2.5
2.7
2.0
2.5
3.0
1975
869.60
883.20
883.20
15.31
15.39
15.53
24.29
24.88
25.50
Growth
Rate
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.4
2.5
2.7
1.9
2.5
3.0
1980
940.91
965.34
975.20
17.24
17.42
17.77
26.67
28.16
29.57
Growth
Rate
1.5
1.8
2.0
2.4
2.5
2.6
1.9
2.5
3.0
1985
1013.36
1056.31
1076.80
19.42
19.71
20.19
29.28
31.86
34.28
Growth
Rate
1.5
1.5
2.0
2.4
2.5
2.6
1.9
2.5
3.0
1990
1091.68
1137.95
1178.87
21.86
22.30
22.95
32.17
36.05
39.74
Growth
Rate
1.5
1.5
2.0
2.4
2.5
2.6
1.9
2.5
3.0
2000
1266.42
1320.09
1449.41
27.77
28.55
29.68
38.81
46.16
53.39
•ESTIMATE
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CHINA BLOC
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT - STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
(EQUIVALENT 1972 DOLLARS, BILLIONS)
COUNTRY
CHINA (PRO
NORTH KOREA
NORTH VIETNAM
1972
140.00*
4.00*
1.6**
GROWTH
RATE
(%)
4.0
6.0
8.0
5.5
7.0
8.5
3.0
4.0
6.0
YEAR
1975
157.48
166.77
176.36
5.28
5.67
6.08
1.75
1.80
1.91
1980
191.6
223.14
259.13
6.90
7.95
9.14
2.03
2.19
2.55
1985
233.11
298.61
380.70
9.02
11.15
13.74
2.35
2.66
3.41
1990
283.61
399.61
559.44
11.79
15.64
20.66
2.72
3.24
4.57
2000
419.82
715.64
1207.79
20.14
30.76
46.72
3.66
4.80
8.18
'ESTIMATE
"DOUGLAS PIKE, "NORTH VIETNAM IN 1974,'
VIETNAM BULLETIN, 1 NOV. 1974.
CHINA BLOC TRADING AND INVESTMENT
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA - STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
(EQUIVALENT 1972 DOLLARS, BILLIONS)
COUNTRY
CHINA (PRO
NORTH KOREA
NORTH VIETNAM
1972
150*
297*
65*
PROJECTION
LOWGNP:HIGH POP.
MED. GNP:MED. POP.
HIGH GNP: LOW POP.
LOWGNP: HIGH POP.
MED. GNP: MED. POP.
HIGH GNP: LOW POP.
LOWGNP: HIGH POP.
MED. GNP: MED. POP.
HIGH GNP: LOW POP.
YEAR
1975
165
182
203
340
368
397
65
68
74
1980
182
223
275
388
456
530
65
72
92
1985
201
272
376
447
566
707
65
77
115
1990
222
347
526
518
716
982
65
83
144
2000
269
548
1045
689
1136
1821
65
94
223
"ESTIMATE
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EUROPE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, GNP/CAP, AND POPULATION PROJECTIONS
BY COUNTRY AND REGION - ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) 1972-2000
(GNP FIGURES IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS)
COUNTRY/REGION
W.GERMANY GNP(BIL)
GNP/CAP.
POP. (MIL.)
FRANCE GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
UNITED GNP
KINGDOM GNP/CAP.
POP.
ITALY GNP
•GNP/CAP.
POP.
SCANDINAVIA GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
1972
285.6
4213
61
218
4200
52
151
2714
56
122.1
2246
55
96
3600
22
%
3.0
3.0
0.5
3.5
3.0
0.8
2.1
2.1
0.6
3.5
3.0
0.8
2.5
2.3
0.7
1975
312
4604
62
242
4590
536
161
2889
57
135
2454
56
103
3854
%
5.0
4.6
0.4
6.0
5.2
0.8
4.0
3.4
0.6
5.0
4.3
0.7
4.0
3.3
1980
398
5765
63
324
5915
55
196
3415
59
172
3029
58
125
4533
%
5.0
4.6
0.4
5.5
4.7
0.8
4.5
3.7
0.8
5.0
4.3
0.7
4.5
3.9
1985
508
7219
64
424
7442
57
244
4095
61
220
3739
60
156
5489
%
4.5
4.1
0.4
5.0
4.3
0.7
4.5
3.8
0.7
5.5
4.8
0.7
4.5
3.9
1990
633
8825
65
541
9185
59
304
4938
63
288
4727
62
194
6646
%
4.0
3.6
0.4
5.0
4.3
0.7
4.5
3.9
0.6
5.5
4.9
0.6
4.5
4.0
2000
937
12569
68
881
13995
63
472
7235
67
492
7627
66
301
9838
DEVELOPING NATIONS
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, GNP/CAP, AND PROPULATION PROJECTIONS
BY COUNTRY AND REGION - ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) 1972-2000
(GNP FIGURES IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS)
COUNTRY/REGION
PEOPLE'S GNP (BIL.)
REP. OF CHINA GNP/CAP.
POP. (MIL.)
INDIA GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
SOUTH AFRICA GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
ALGERIA GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
ZAIRE GNP
GNP/CAP.
POP.
1972
140*
150
780
58
98
565
21
891
24
7
469
15
2.3
122
23
%
2.0
1.4
1.6
3.0
2.4
2.6
2.0
0.5
2.5
5.0
1.6
3.4
1.1
1.5
2.5
1975
149
156.39
820
63
105
610
22.3
904
26
8.1
520
17
2.4
128
24
%
6.0
4.4
1.6
5.0
2.5
2.5
6.0
3.4
2.6
5.5
1.9
3.6
6.0
3.4
2.6
1980
199
193.96
885
80
119
690
29.8
1069
30
10.6
571
20
3.2
151
28
%
6.0
4.5
1.5
5.5
3.2
2.3
6.0
3.3
2.7
6.0
2.3
3.7
6.0
3.2
2.8
1985
266
241.71
950
105
139
775
39.9
1257
35
14.2
640
24
4.3
177
32
%
6.0
4.6
1.4
6.0
3.9
2.1
6.0
3.4
2.6
7.0
3.6
3.4
7.0
4.3
2.7
1990
356
302.65
1025
141
168
860
53.4
1486
39
19.9
704
29
6
219
36
%
6.0
4.8
1.2
7.0
5.1
1.9
7.0
4.7
2.3
7.5
4.4
3.1
7.0
4.5
2.5
2000
638
483.68
1150
277
276
1000
105
2352
49
41
1175
40
11.8
340
47
•ESTIMATE
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ATTACHMENTII
THE PROSPECTS FOR RAW MATERIALS
As a long term trend from 1930 to 1970, world
production of raw materials has increased very
markedly. Although U.S. production and con-
sumption continued to climb after World War II,
its share of world production has dropped pre-
cipitously. A curve of steel consumption showed
that the peak of use of this material occurs at
roughly $2000 GNP per capita, after which the
increment falls off. This indicates that young
economies tend to use steel more intensively
than more mature economies as well as contribut-
ing to the explanation of recent rapid growth
of world demand for raw materials.
On a dollar basia, the price of raw materials has
roughly doubled in the last twenty years. This is
an annual increase of about 3%, which is roughly
the rate of inflation for this period. However, the
largest part of these increases has occurred in the
last three years. This recent development has come
about for several reasons. The first is the read-
justment in world currency rates which has taken
place since 1971. Furthermore, the world stock of
money increased as boom conditions characterized
most of the world's major economies. When we
look at some specific materials, we see a charac-
teristic pattern of price changes during the last
two years. Copper rose fairly stadily from the fall
of 1973 and reached a peak in the summer of
1974, after which it has declined to present levels
which are below those of late 1973. Tin prices rose
fairly strongly during the same period but now
have declined from high levels of the summer of
1974, stabilizing at levels of about 45% above
those of the summer of 1973. Zinc prices have
followed a similar pattern, while aluminum rose
more gradually, and has now stabilized at a point
around 46% above a year ago.
A chart showing the dependence of the United
States on various impacted raw materials should
not be misinterpreted; dependence is not the same
as vulnerability. For instance, uranium becomes
much more plentiful as the price increases. Both
the price elasticity of supply and the volume/
grade relationships indicate very long range avail-
ability of all significant raw materials.
A series of roadblocks raise serioius questions
about future U.S. mineral production. The first
is simply a general atmosphere of uncertainty
regarding the future. This is complicated by the
present squeeze on capital resources and the
inevitable time lag involved in construction facili-
ties for production of raw materials. Finally, and
perhaps most important, is the lack of government
incentives for exploitation of mineral deposits. We
therefore foresee relatively slow development of
U.S. supplies and raw materials, with little change
likely for the medium run future. It follows that
the U.S. will continue to depend on world markets
for many of its raw materials. At present, high
priority is being given to solving the energy crisis
and to complying with environmental regulations.
Stockpiling is the most obvious and apparently the
most effective method of insulating the U.S.
against vulnerability of raw materials supplies.
Current and recent policy on stockpiling has been
rather confused. Whether the purpose of stock-
piling shoud be strategic or economic has not
been clear. Until the Nixon administration intro-
*This attachment was prepared by Ernest E. Schneider of the Hudson Institute, based on research by Rudy
Ruggles, David Harmon, and others of the Hudson research staff. A chartbook too long for inclusion in
this report is available on request.
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duced some basic changes in stockpiling, the basic
objective has been strategic, that is, the main-
tenance of a one-year supply as a buffer against
shortages during a war time situation. The Nixon
administration changed this objective to one which
was basically economic. It transferred authority
for stockpiles from the Office of Emergency
Planning to the General Services Administration,
and, in 1973, decided to reduce these stocks from
the level of $6.6 billion to $.7 billion, that is, a
90% drop. The real objective of the change in
policy was to use the stockpiles as a method of
combating inflation. Among the most important
arguments in favor of stockpiling raw materials
are: 1) a deterrent against the formation of raw
materials cartels, 2) to help American allies to
meet shortages, and 3) to have a buffer stock to
permit time for the development of substitute
materials. The strongest argument against stock-
piling—that stockpiles should be liquidated to
fight inflation—is, in our view, questionable. It is
worth noting that a consequence of the stockpile
liquidation is that it produced a one-time sort of
windfall in government receipts, which helps to
bring down deficits in the Federal budget. At the
present time, sentiment in favor or stockpiling is
becoming stronger; for example, a Congressional
subcommittee recently reached the conclusion
that stockpiles for only one year were inadequate
and favored instead stockpiles for a three year
period. If there is some cause for dissatisfaction
with American stockpiling policy, it is only fair to
note that no large OECD country maintains any
official raw materials stockpiles. Sweden is the
only example; West Germany and Japan have con-
sidered doing so but taken no action.
The Hudson position is that it is unlikely that new
raw materials cartels will be formed by producing
countries on the pattern of OPEC—although
there will be many attempts. If one studies the
main raw materials supplying countries, one finds
a pretty clear pattern. They characteristically are
heavily dependent upon sales of a single raw
material, but are only one of several major suppliers
of this ame material. The recent and continuing
worldwide inflation and the need to accumulate
hard currencies provides, however, a strong impetus
for such countries to try to form cartels in order
to protect themselves. Nevertheless, the great
diversity—geographic and political—that exists
among countries which supply a particular material,
such as bauxite, indicates that it would be
extremely difficult to form such a cartel and have
it operate effectively. Another impediment is that
demand elasticity for most raw materials is much
higher than for oil. Further, without the ideological
glue which helps to hold OPEC together, it is
difficult to arrive at the terms on which self-
interest should be sacrificed to the interests of the
cartel. Hudson Institute does foresee a trend
towards the processing of raw materials to move
away from consuming countries to producing
countries. This pattern provides an incentive for
"good behavior" on the part of raw materials
producing contries.
So far as raw materials cartels along the lines of
OPEC are concerned, we should note that a
developed country, Australia, is a member of the
Bauxite producers group (CIPEC). In effect the
less developed areas of developed countries often
produce raw materials. In the case of the tin
council, Malaysia is very responsive to price hanges.
The United States has recently constructed a large
very modern smelter in Thailand which produces
an important by-product. It is interesting to note
that the Peoples Rupublic of China is now parti-
cipating in the Tungsten Committee, put together
under the auspices of the United Nations.
In general we believe that prices for raw materials
have crested and will probably decline smoewhat
from recent or present levels. Two main factors
point in this direction. The slackening of the world
economy, of course, brings about a weakening of
demand. Meanwhile, high price levels have intro-
duced imprtant incentives to build up production
capacity, which, within a few years, will of course
produce increased supplies, reestablishing a more
traditional balance.
Great progress in raw mateials production is being
made around the world. The U.S. certainly has no
monopoly on finding and developing raw materials.
The characteristics of mineral industries first
require a definition of what is a mineral. In general
one could say that it is some sort of rock that is
found in the ground. In terms of impact, raw
materials production amounts to 3 or 4% of the
U.S. GNP but, if one considers the value added to
these raw materials, it is closer to 15%. It is impor-
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tant to keep an open mind in discussion the
dimensions of U.S. reserves. For one thing, real
reserves are often not reported by producing com-
panies for tax reasons. Furthermore, for some
raw materials one must consider the availability of
scrap. In addition, the neeed for supplies of various
kinds of raw materials varies as technology
develops. For example, the open hearth method of
producing stel depends heavily upon availability
of scrap. As this method is phased out, the demand
for iron ore changes. Some other raw materials
are truly non-renewable.
The question of avialability of raw materials in this
country is confused by political uncertainties. For
example, a much clearer definition of rights to
raw materials is needed. Furthermore, raw materials
in this country are found in land which is both
private and government-owned. We must remember
that a very long time lag is usually involved in the
development of hard rock minerals. Price con-
siderations also play a critical role. For example,
lower grade copper can become available if the
price is right, but the availability goes down if an
oversupply develops. Furthermore, costs often rise
with higher prices. Some minerals have very high
unit value while others have a very low unit value.
This consdideration has a strong effect upon the
practicality of transporting materials over long
distances.
Statistics for 1973 and 1974 give a fairly clear
picture of the present U.S. raw material situation.
Once can say that the total value of U.S. raw
material production has gone up dramatically while
production levels themselves by volume have
declined slightly. Recent price increases for fuel
have, of course, played a major part in this picture.
Tables on the roles of materials in the U.S. eco-
nomy and on U.S. foreign trade in raw materials
for 1973 and 1974 indicate a genral erosion of the
U.S. position; this contrast is mainly a matter of
prices. The U.S. deficit in foreign trade in these
mateials rose form $8 billion in 1973 to an esti-
mated $23 billion for 1974, mainly as a result of
a huge increase in the price of crude oil and refined
petroleum imports.
In general one can say that U.S. independence in
the supply of raw materials is impossible, and not
necessarily desirable. The continental United
States has been thoroughly explored for raw
materials by conventional methods. But the
adoption of new mathods can certainly open new
horizons. So far as processing is concerned, environ-
mental regulations are causing very serious prob-
lems, particularly, for smelting operations. Never-
theless, considerable progress in meeting this
problem has been accomplished in Japan and
Germany where the cost of environmental con-
trols is considered as a normal production cost.
The current energy crunch is bringing about some
very significant changes in technology for raw
materials processing. In reality U.S. industry is
not very highly developed technologically in
comparison with some foreign countries. For
example, none of our blast furnaces are among
the 30 largest in the world. Japan has much more
advanced copper smelters than we do. One reason
for the uneven development of U.S. facilities is
the difficulty of writing off existing plants; this
takes about 17 years. Nevertheless, the U.S. is
doing very will, for example, in the development of
iron into pellets, as the very rich iron ore reserves
in the Midwest have become depleted. Much newer
plants have been constructed in Arizona for the
refining of high grade copper. In zinc we have a
very serious smelter problem and many of them
are shut down. The situation in lead is less unfavor-
able, largely through the use of scrap. So far as
coal is concerned, there is the question of whether
we should exploit our traditional coal mining
supplies in the Western United States. Shortages
of raw materials tend to go in cycles; copper is an
example of this phenomenon.
So far as U.S. relations with the rest of the world
in raw materials are concerned, it is obviously
safer to depend upon such close neighbors as
Mexico and Canada. It is very clear that we must
develop superports if we are to continue to import
large amounts of foreign crude oil. Massive dis-
coveries of raw materials have occurred abroad and
we should expect that further new discoveries will
occur in the rest of the world. Japan, for example,
is turning to South America in its search for raw
materials; one reason is that there ahs been much
less prior exploration in South American than
there has been here. West Germany has been
successful in making arrangements which in effect
tie up supplies of certain materials for long periods
of time. Although the United States in the past
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has been more interested in making profits than in
insuring long term rights, the U.S. is learning how
to follow the German example. As world trade in
raw materials has expanded, so has an interna-
tional system for the transport of these materials.
Many new techniques have been adopted for
transport. We can anticipate that both the pro-
duction and consumption of raw materials will
continue to increase outside of this country. For
example, Japan today is among the first three steel
producers in the world. It would be erroneous to
assume that we are running out of raw materials.
The key need here is for good managment of raw
materials supply. In reality, other industrial coun-
tries are more dependent upon foreign raw
materials than is the United States. At present,
the less developed countries are suffering more
than the United States in the raw mateials market.
Communist countries do not engage in raw
materials trade to the extent that the rest of the
world does. Their costs are more hidden, and
shortages and surpluses affect these countries less
than they do the rest of the world.
We can expect that the volume and value of inter-
national trade in raw materials will be very high.
For example, Japan depends upon imports for two
thirds of her raw materials, a total of some $35
billion annually, of which oil represents $17
billion and metals $5 billion. North China could
become a very important source of raw materials
for Japan. Furthermore, we are seeing major
development of offshore areas for raw materials;
for example, the deposits of oil which are being
exploited in the North Sea. Brazil, Australia, and
India have important iron ore deposits which
the United States might be interested in importing.
High grade copper deposits are being exploited
now in Africa.
In general, the importance of U.S. foreign trade
in oil and iron ore is increasing. Our coal is used
mainly at home but exports continue, mainly
because of the quality of U.S. coal. The prices
of raw mateials are continuing to skyrocket. In
the old days, raw materials played a rather minor
role in U.S. foreign trade. Today, they are a very
major factor indeed. What we need most of all is
international cooperation in raw materials trade.
helping to aggravate price swings even beyond what
would normally be expected. Raw materials con-
stitute an important exception to the labor theory
of value. Their price is determined by demand;
that is, their prices can go down even though
production costs rise. It was fashionable a few
years ago to engage in spectrum analysis of raw
materials, based upon mathematical formulae.
This analysis frequently produced the conclusion
that the higher the price, the greater the demand.
In fact, this was tracing a supply curve, not a
demand curve.
Investment in raw-materials futures by non-users
and non-suppliers of raw materials has tended to
destabilize markets. The prices of futures are less
a function of the raw materials markets them-
selves than of a flow of funds throughout various
money markets. (The same thing is true for the
stock market.) Investments of this kind have in
themselves tended to support raw material prices,
by causing an inflow of speculative funds gener-
ally. This situation is complicated by the fact that
such investors are interested in a range of differ-
ent materials. For example, they view gold and
silver as a part of a general portfolio. The result
is a highly volatile market situation in which
developments in one commodity spill over into a
totally different commodity market. We therefore
occasionally see sudden drops or jumps in raw-
materials prices, without any apparent reason.
This phenomenon tends to aggravate price swings.
Theoretically, speculation in futures should dam-
pen price swings over the long run. But in practice,
projections of price trends by knowledgeable
producers for raw materials have often proved to
be wrong. (Copper is an outstanding example.)
In general, "experts" expect current trends to
continue indefinitely into the future.
The existence of national and international inven-
tories of raw materials also can have destabilizing
effects on prices. Normally, they encourage a
tendency to buy when prices are low and sell when
prices are high. But today, Japan is displaying an
inclination to panic in both directions of the price
swing: it has bought at high prices, and is now sell-
ing at low prices.
Institutional changes in raw materials markets are We are also seeing a change in the structure of the
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business cycle. Prior to about 1965, construction
acted as an internal stabilizer. When interest rates
fell, funds flowed into financial intermediaries and
stimulated mortgage lending and new construction.
Thus, as raw-materials demand fell generally,
construction demand rose. Now, the entire eco-
nomy tends to move into recession simultaneously.
Demand for raw materials by both industry and
housing rises and falls together. For example.
Western Electric buys certain plastics for use in
telephones. Their purchases have been cut by
about 60% because fewer dwelling units are being
built. The same phenomenon applies to copper,
which is used for wiring and such appliances as air
conditioners.
Furthermore, swings in the business cycle are now
being aggravated by international developments.
Previously, we had been accustomed to seeing a
sort of see-saw movement between the United
States and other developed countries. For 150
years boom conditions in the U.S. tended to
increase costs and push Europe into a recession,
and vice versa. Under present conditions, very
close connections exist between the financial
markets of the United States, Europe, and Japan,
causing a parallelism in economic activity. Com-
modities such as copper and aluminum are tend-
ing to decrease in price under conditions of uni-
versal recession. We can expect that they will go
up quite sharply if and when international busi-
ness conditions improve (again in phase with one
another).
Quite apart from financial considerations, institu-
tional factors are influencing raw materials mar-
kets. In this country, there is a tendency for
mineral reserves and lands to be taken over by oil
companies. This results from the fact that oil
companies acquire rights to the minerals in broad
areas when they are primarily interested in petro-
leum. New techniques are being used. For example,
a mercury tracer system permits companies to
explore for various minerals merely by repeated
flights over the territory in question with highly
sophisticated instruments. In general, since the
60s, oil companies have been characterized by high
cash flows and high profitability. As energy prices
have gone up, other raw materials prices are
tending to decline. We are seeing something of a
recession in exploration and development expendi-
tures as demand declines.
Long term shifts are occurring inthe production
costs for raw materials, which serve as a floor
under long-term prices for these materials. Labor
costs have gone up sharply in the last seven or eight
years, following increases in raw materials prices.
This tends to have a sort of a ratchet effect. When
prices for raw materials decline, however, labor
costs do not go down accordingly. Capital costs for
raw materials, mining, and processing are also goint
up. This can be compensated by increasing the
efficiency of the use of capital in mining opera-
tions. Nevertheless, we are seeing a long term rise
in the cost of such capital per pound of output,
particularly as interest rates have increased. The
most important single factor in current operating
production costs is the snap increase in energy
prices. This is particularly true for such electro-
metals such as copper and aluminum, which
require enormous amounts of electric power for
their operation.
Less developed countries have a strong incentive to
try to emulate OPEC in forming producer-cartels
to improve their terms of trade. For example,
while Chile has seen the price of her raw material
exports go up, her food imports have risen even
more. This provides an impetus for long term
barter agreements. Nevertheless, cartels are not
likely to be very effective in the raw materials
area, because demand is a much more important
factor than supply. If we look at the long term,
we see no evidence that the world is actually
running out of raw materials. On the contrary,
new technology tends to outstrip the depletion
of resources. The normal pattern is that the cost
of exploiting raw materials becomes lower as the
quality of the ore decreases. High-grade ore tends
to be mined under conditions where labor is used
intensively. In more recent years, we have seen new
technology developed so that low-grade ore in
the Western United States is now produced less
expensively than high-grade ore in Africa. The
reason is that much less labor is needed in the
American operation.
We can look forward to technological break-
throughs in raw material exploitation similar to
the development of pelletized steel when the
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Mesabi range became depleted. Right now, efforts
are being made to develop non-electric modes of
reducing aluminum in which a chemical process
is used instead. At present, the price of aluminum
is to a large extent a function of the price of
electricity. We may see the development of copper
shifting from copper oxide and sulfide to sul-
phates. There is considerable room for economies
of scale in the transport of raw materials. Some-
thing like supertankers may be developed which
would bring refineries closer to energy centers.
It is quite probable that we will see more bilateral
arrangements between countries producing raw
materials and those producing energy products.
For example, Iran might make long term deals
exchanging fertilizer for copper from Zaire. In
any case, instability in commodity markets tends
to encourage barter arrangements.
There has not been a great deal of opposition by
industrial nations to higher prices of raw materials.
We should not expect a sharp upswing in interna-
tional trade. The time lag for developing facilities
to exploit raw materials is roughly five years. Thus,
we have a rather strong limit on raw materials
supplies over the short run. Demand for raw
materials is not merely a function of rising GNP.
We also have volatile money affecting these mar-
kets very significantly.
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ATTACHMENT
DISCRETIONARY PERSONAL,
TRANSPORTATION, AND AIR
TRANSPORTATION INCOME TO THE
YEAR 2000
The following tables indicate some of the steps
required to project the amount of money that may
be available for personal discretionary air trans-
portation (i.e., non-business) travel. The projec-
tion is complex, and much depends on factors
such as the possibility of public subsidy of high-
speed rail connections between relatively closely-
spaced city-pairs, such as those in large megalo-
politan complexes, like the coastal and Great
Lakes "corridors." However, enough has been done
here to show that, on a range of reasonable extra-
polations, the U.S. market may grow, between now
and the Year 2000, by a factor of between two and
five, in constant dollars. A "best estimate" would
be a factor of three for the U.S., while the world
market for both business and discretionary air
travel may grow by a factor of ten, as discussed
above, from 1975 to 2000. It is also reasonable to
expect air travel prices per seat-mile simultaneously
to fall, in constant (not current) dollars, as they
have in the past, because of improved technology
and economies of scale. This scenario could be
falsified by a surprisingly cost-distorting rise in
energy prices, which we consider unlikely but not
impossible, for reasons discussed above.
69
DISCRETIONARY PURCHASING POWER AND SPENDING
Year
1946
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973 (est.)
Aggregate
Purchasing Power
$ 166.5
222.9
297.9
371.6
508.6
723.9
799.7
884.3
985.4
Discretionary
Purchasing Power
$ 69.6
91.5
124.9
143.6
210.4
288.3
328.9
373.7
421.2
Discretionary
Spending
$ 54.9
82.3
107.6
126.6
172.3
240.8
264.0
289.3
322.1
%of
DPP
Spent
78.9
90.0
86.2
88.2
81.9
83.5
80.3
77.4
76.5
Current U.S. dollars, billions
Aggregate Purchasing Power = national income plus increase in credit available to individuals:
(e.g., individual's yearly income) $ 10,000
individual Bank Americard
credit level is increased
from $500 to $1,000 + 500
Individual's Total Purchasing Power $ 10,500
Discretionary Purchasing Power = Aggregate purchasing power less:
Essential purchases (food, clothing and "essential" transportation), fixed
commitments (life insurance premia, tenant rent, interest component of
mortgage payment, homeowner's taxes), imputed income (employee
lodging and food, lodging and clothing for the military) and contracted
savings (pension plans, Christmas clubs, etc.)
Discretionary Spending = Discretionary purchasing power less savings
SOURCE: CONFERENCE BOARD'S TIME SERIES OF "DISCRETIONARY SPENDING" TECHNICAL PAPER #77.
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DISCRETIONARY PURCHASING POWER AND SPENDING - PROJECTIONS
1975 - 2000
Year
1975
1980
1985
1990
2000
Case
I
II
III
I
II
III
I
II
III
I
II
III
I
II
III
Disposable
Personal Income
845
870
895
930
1,010
1,120
1,030
1,170
1,390
1,150
1,350
1,775
1,375
1,825
2,900
Aggregate
Purchasing Power3
930
955
985
1,025
1,110
1,230
1,135
1,285
1,530
1,265
1,485
1,950
1,510
2,010
3,190
Discretionary
Purchasing Power b
280 - 370
285 - 380
295 - 395
310-410
335 - 445
370 - 490
340 - 455
385-515
460-610
380 - 505
445 - 595
585 - 780
455 - 605
605 - 805
960- 1275
Discretionary
Spending0
225 - 335
230 - 340
235 - 355
250 - 370
270 - 400
295 - 440
270-410
310-465
370 - 550
305 - 455
355 - 535
470 - 705
365 - 545
485 - 725
770-1150
Constant 1973 U.S. dollars - billions
ASSUMPTIONS
aAggregate purchasing power = 110% of disposable personal income due to credit availability to individuals
Discretionary purchasing power = 30-40% of aggregate purchasing power
""Discretionary spending = 80-90% of discretionary purchasing power
SOURCE: CONFERENCE BOARD
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES TOTAL AND TRANSPORTATION 1950-1972
Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
Consumption
$191.0
254.4
325.2
432.8
617.6
667.2
726.5
805.2
Transportation
Expenditures:
$ 24.7
35.6
43.1
58.2
77.8
90.4
100.2
109.2
User Operated
$ 21.9
32.6
39.8
54.4
72.3
84.6
93.9
102.6
Purchased Local
Purchased
Intercity
$2.8
3.0
3.3
3.8
2.5
2.6
2.6
2.6
3.0
3.3
3.6
4.0
Airlines
2.4
2.7
3.0
3.4
SOURCES:
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, JULY 1974
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
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DISCRETIONARY TRANSPORTATION EXPENDITURES 1970-1973
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
Total
Transportation
Expenditures
77.8
90.4
100.2
109.2
User Operated
xO.551
40.0
47.0
52.0
56.4
Taxicabs2
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
Purchased
Intercity3
3.0
3.3
3.6
4.0
Total
Discretionary
Transportation
Expenditures
43.8
51.1
56.4
61.2
ASSUMPTIONS: 145% of user operated transportation expenditures estimated to be work related
Only taxicab portion of total purchased local transportation assumed to be discretionary
^Current U.S. dollars - billions
SOURCE: CONFERENCE BOARD
DISCRETIONARY TRANSPORTATION EXPENDITURES
PROJECTIONS 1975-2000
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1975
1980
1985
1990
2000
Case
I
II
III
I
II
III
I
II
III
I
II
III
I
II
III
Disposable
Personal Income
$ 691.7
746.0
802.5
903.7
845
870
895
930
1010
1120
1030
1170
1390
1150
1350
1775
1375
1825
2900
Total
Discretionary Spending
$240.8
264.0
289.3
322.1
225-335
230-340
235-355
350-370
270-400
295-440
270-410
310-465
370-550
305-455
355-535
470-705
365-545
485-725
770-1150
Total Discretionary
Transportatin Expenditure
$43.8
51.1
56.4
61.2
45- 70
46- 71
47- 75
50- 81
54- 88
59- 97
54- 94
62-107
74-127
61-109
71-128
94-169
73-136
97-181
1 54-288
1970-1973: Current U.S. dollars, billions
1975-2000: Constant 1973 U.S. dollars, billions
ASSUMPTIONS: Total Discretionary Transportation Expenditures:
(a) remains at 20% of Total Discretionary Spending
(b) increases to 25% of Total Discretionary Spending by 2000
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